National Parks Conservation Association v. The Board of Trustees of the School and Institutional Trust : Brief of Petitioner by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2007
National Parks Conservation Association v. The
Board of Trustees of the School and Institutional
Trust : Brief of Petitioner
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Wayne G. Petty; Moyle & Draper; Attorney for Petitioners.
Thomas A. Mitchell; Attorney for Respondent; Barry L. Huntington; Garfield County Attorney;
Attorney for Respondent.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, National Parks Conservation Association v. The Board of Trustees of the School and Institutional Trust, No. 20070835 (Utah
Court of Appeals, 2007).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/507
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
NATIONAL PARKS CONSERVATION 
ASSOCIATION and WILLIAM WOLVERTON, 
PETITIONERS 
vs. 
THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE 
SCHOOL AND INSTITUTIONAL TRUST 
INSTITUTIONAL TRUST LANDS 
ADMINISTRATION, STATE OF UTAH, 
and GARFIELD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GARFIELD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
CASE NO. 2007G835-SC 
RESPONDENTS 
BRIEF OF PETITIONERS 
WAYNE G. PETTY 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Petitioners 
<r 
THOMAS A. MITCHELL 
Special Attorney General for 
Utah School and Institutional Trust'Land 
Administration 
675 East 500 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Attorney for Respondent Utah School 
And Institutional Trust Land 
Administration 
BARRY L. HUNTINGTON 
Garfield County Attorney 
55 South Main Street 
P. O. Box 388 
Panguitch, UT 84759 
Attorney for Respondent Garfield 
County 
FILED 
UTAH APP5^ f ATC rOUfffl 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
NATIONAL PARKS CONSERVATION 
ASSOCIATION and WILLIAM WOLVERTON, 
PETITIONERS 
vs. 
THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE 
SCHOOL AND INSTITUTIONAL TRUST 
INSTITUTIONAL TRUST LANDS 
ADMINISTRATION, STATE OF UTAH, 
and GARFIELD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GARFIELD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
RESPONDENTS 
CASE NO. 20070835-SC 
BRIEF OF PETITIONERS 
WAYNE G. PETTY 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Petitioners 
THOMAS A. MITCHELL 
Special Attorney General for 
Utah School and Institutional Trust Land 
Administration 
675 East 500 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Attorney for Respondent Utah School 
And Institutional Trust Land 
Administration 
BARRY L. HUNTINGTON 
Garfield County Attorney 
55 South Main Street 
P. O. Box 388 
Panguitch, UT 84759 
Attorney for Respondent Garfield 
County 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ADDENDUM TABLE OF CONTENTS vi 
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW; STANDARD OF 
REVIEW; CITATION TO RECORD 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES DETERMINATIVE OF 
THE APPEAL OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE 10 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 11 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 11 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 12 
C. DISPOSITION BELOW 13 
D. STATEMENT OF FACTS 14 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 30 
ARGUMENT 31 
I. THE McCONKIE APPRAISAL DISREGARDED MATERIAL 
FACTORS OF TOPOGRAPHY, REGULATORY CONSTRAINTS AND 
UNAVAILABILITY OF KEY SERVICES; NPCA HAS STANDING TO 
ASSERT THOSE CLAIMS 32 
II. AS A "LIMITED RESTRICTED USE REPORT," THE McCONKIE 
APPRAISAL FAILED TO FULFILL THIS COURT'S REQUIREMENTS 
FOR A "RELIABLE APPRAISAL." 35 
III. THE ADMITTED 330.5% DISPARITY BETWEEN THE 
CONSIDERATION GIVEN AND THAT RECEIVED BY GARFIELD 
COUNTY, IF ACCEPTED AS CORRECT, DISCLOSES AN 
UNLAWFUL TRANSACTION UNDER THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS 
WHICH COULD INITIALLY HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED BY INTERIM 
MEASURES WITHIN SITLA AUTHORITY TO INITIATE 37 
i 
IV. NEITHER THE "CLAIM PRECLUSION" NOR THE "ISSUE 
PRECLUSION" BRANCHES OF THE RES JUDICATA DOCTRINE 
FORECLOSE NPCA'S CHALLENGE TO THE UNLAWFUL 
CONSIDERATION TO GARFIELD COUNTY DISCLOSED BY THE 
McCONKIE APPRAISAL 40 
V. IN ADDRESSING THE APPRAISAL ERRORS AND UNLAWFUL 
CONSIDERATION, SITLA SHOULD SUSPEND ITS APPROVAL OF 
THE McCONKIE APPRAISAL, INITIATE PROCEEDINGS TO 
INVALIDATE THE PREVIOUSLY-EXCHANGED DEEDS, AND GIVE 
FULL CONSIDERATION TO THE FEASIBILITY OF STRUCTURING 
AN ALTERNATIVE DISPOSITION, AT FAIR VALUE, TO AN ENTITY 
COMMITTED TO PROTECTING THE NONECONOMIC "UNIQUE 
SCENIC, PALEONTOLOGICAL, AND ARCHEOLOGICAL VALUES" 
OF PARK SECTION 16 IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS COURT'S 
GUIDANCE IN NPCA-I 41 
CONCLUSION 43 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
CASES 
Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Board, 
2006 UT 74, 148 P.3d 960 3 
Committee of Consumer Services v. Public Service Commission of Utah. 
2003 UT 29, 75 P.3d 481 44 
Gibson v. Department of Employment Sec. 840 P.2d 780 (Utah App.,1992) 44 
Harvev v.Sanders. 534 P.2d 905 (Utah 1975) 4 
Macris & Associates. Inc. v. Newavs. Inc. 2000 UT 23, 
16 P.3d 1214 (Utah 2000) 40,41 
Municipal Building Authority of Iron County v. Lowder. 711 P.2d273 (Utah 1985) . . 38 
National Parks and Conservation Association v. Board of State Lands. 
869 P.2d 909 (1993) 1, 2, 7, 9, 11-14, 17, 23, 26,28, 29, 31, 32, 38, 40-44 
Price Development Co.. L.P. v. Orem City. 2000 UT 26, 995 P.2d 1237 38 
Salt Lake County Com'n v. Salt Lake Co. Atty. 1999 UT 73, 985 P.2d 899 38 
Sears v. Qgden City. Utah. 533 P.2d 118 (1975) 38 
Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Board and Sevier Power Co.. 
2006 UT 74,148 P.3d 960 (2006) 34 
Sorenson v. Beers. 585 P.2d 458 (Utah 1978) 4 
United States and National Parks and Conservation Association v. 
Garfield County and State of Utah. 122 F.Supp.2d 1201 (2000) 21 
Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Board. 
148 P.3d 960,2006 UT 74 1, 34 i i i 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 53C-1-304 (1953) 1,9 
Utah Code Ann. § 53C-1-204 39 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l (1953) 4, 11 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1953) 1, 3, 5, 8, 9 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12 (1953) 9 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, 
Standard Rule 1-2 (The Appraisal Foundation, 
2006) 6, 10, 16, 21, 30, 32, 33, 35, 36 
iv 
ADDENDUM TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1. Order from Which This Appeal is Taken, Record document Number 31, R. 516-
539: 
Order of Board of Trustees of School and Institutional Trust Lands 
Administration, State of Utah: (1) Separating Adjudicative Proceedings; (2) 
Granting State's Motion to Dismiss Appeal of Agency Action Re: 
Exchange No. 188; and (3) Continuing Consideration of Request for 
Rulemaking. 
Dated September 13, 2007. 
2. Preliminary Statement on Behalf of the National parks Conservation Association 
and William Wolverton Regarding Issues of Fact and Law to be Detemiined in the 
Above Matter, dated December 12, 2006. 
v 
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT 
This case presents a Petition for Review of final agency action taken by the Board 
of Trustees ["SITLA Board"] of the State Institutional and Trust Lands Administration 
["SITLA"] on review of an administrative appeal filed by the National Parks 
Conservation Association (NPCA)1 and NPCA member William Wolverton.2 Jurisdiction 
for this appeal is granted by U.C.A. 1953, § 63-46b-16, implementing the jurisdiction for 
judicial review of final action by the SITLA Board of Trustees also vested by U.C.A. 
1953, § 53C-1-304.3. 
This Court's order dated November 5, 2007determined that this matter should be 
retained in the Supreme Court. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW; STANDARD OF 
REVIEW; CITATION TO RECORD 
I. Standard of Review Applicable to all Issues Listed Below: 
Whether the "person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced" by 
the agency's decision, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4), in the sense that 'the alleged error 
was not harmless." Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Board, 2006 UT 
74,^15, 148 P.3d 960, 967. 
1
 Subsequent to this Court's decision in National Parks and Conservation 
Association v. Board of State Lands. 869 P.2d 909 (1993) ("NPCA-I"), NPCA struck the 
word "and" from its name, and is now known as the "National Parks Conservation 
Association." It is undisputed that NPCA remains the same organization. 
2
 Use of the term "NPCA" hereafter includes Wolverton unless the context 
indicates consideration of his individual interests or actions. 
1 
II. Standing Issues: 
A. Whether NPCA, a nonprofit conservation organization devoted to 
protection of national park lands and their natural, scenic, aesthetic and recreational 
values, and an individual member of NPCA residing in Garfield County, had standing 
before SITLA, and the SITLA Board on administrative appeal, to assert and obtain 
consideration of the following claims and issues contesting agency approval of a new 
appraisal for exchange of school trust lands within Capitol Reef National Park in return 
for lands proffered by Garfield County ("Exchange 188") following this Court's 
recognition of NPCA's "limited right of intervention" and remand order in National 
Parks and Conservation Association v. Board of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909, 922 (n. 11), 
924 (1993) ("NPCA-I") 
B. In dismissing NPCA's administrative appeal on the ground that a "third 
party" could not participate in "executive real property decisions" and did "not have 
standing to attack SITLA's substantive internal decision making," whether the SITLA 
Board erred in denying standing on the basis of this Court's intervention analysis in 
NPCA-L 869 P. 2d at 914, 922 (n. 11), where NPCA's current claims did not seek direct 
participation in the proceedings, were presented only after SITLA's consideration of the 
appraisal, and sought only post-decision consideration of factual errors in the appraisal 
analysis and of legal issues affecting validity of the exchange transaction. 
2 
1. Standard of Review: 
(a) Standing in administrative adjudications is to be determined 
as a "general question of law" subject to a correctness standard of review. 
Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Board. 2006 UT 74, 
TJ12, 148 P.3d 960, 966; and whether the agency "erroneously interpreted or 
applied the law." Utah Administrative Procedures Act, U.C.A. 1953, § 63-
46b-16(4)(d). 
(b) Whether the agency "engaged in an unlawful procedure or 
decision-making process." U.C.A. § 63-46b-16(4)(e). 
2. Record Preserving the Issues 
(a) NPCA's initial "Appeal from Final Agency Action By The 
SITLA Director Dated 15 September 2006 In Re Exchange 188" at 3-5, 
Record ("R") 30. 
(b) NPCA's "Preliminary Statement on Behalf of the National 
Parks Conservation Association and William Wolverton Regarding Issues 
of Fact and Law To Be Determined In The Above Matter" at 2-3, 6. 
(Omitted from Record; attached in the Addendum) 
(c) NPCA's "Opposition To State of Utah's Motion To Dismiss 
Appeal of Agency Action In Re Exchange 188 and Request for 
Rulemaking" at 28-29, R. 263-64. 
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(d) NPCA's "Appellant's Response To Proposed Order" at 2-4, 
6-8,9, R. 447-49, 451-53, 454. 
III. Standards of Administrative Decision 
Whether the SITLA Board failed to comply with applicable standards of decision 
in dismissing, for lack of standing, NPCA's administrative appeal from SITLA's approval 
of a new appraisal of values for Exchange 188, where NPCA's claims of remediable 
injury and its substantive claims of unlawful action and abuse of discretion both rested on 
statements of record by the appraiser, and factual allegations and public records proffered 
by NPCA, which demonstrated material omissions and disregard of material information 
and analyses in a new appraisal relied on by SITLA to satisfy the remand in NPCA-L 
1. Standard of Review: 
(a) Whether the agency decision, on a motion to dismiss or for 
summary judgment construed the pleadings in the light most favorable to 
the appellants, indulged all reasonable inferences in their favor, considered 
only facts not in dispute, and ruled for the movant only if it appeared as a 
matter of law that appellants could not prevail" U.C.A. 1953 § 63-46b-l 
(adopting Rules 12(b) and 56, U.R.C.P. for administrative adjudications); 
Harvev v. Sanders, 534 P.2d 905 (Utah 1975)(standards for 
dismissal/summary judgment); Sorenson v. Beers. 585 P.2d 458, at 460 
(Utah 1978)(standards for dismissal). 
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(b) Utah Administrative Procedures Act, U.C.A. 1953, § 63-46b-
16(4)(c) ("agency has not decided all issues requiring resolution"); § 63-
46b-16(4)(d) (agency "erroneously interpreted or applied the law") and § 
63-46b-16(4)(e) (agency "engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-
making process"). 
2. Record Preserving The Issue 
(a) NPCA's "Opposition To State of Utah's Motion To Dismiss 
Appeal of Agency Action In Re Exchange 188 and Request for 
Rulemaking" at 2, 15 [para, (c)], 20 [paras, (c) and (d)], 21 [para, (f)], 22-
23, 29, R. 237, 250, 255, 256, 257-58,264. 
(b) Appellant's Response To Proposed Order" at 4-5, 6-8, 9-10, 
14-15, R. 449-50, 451-53, 454-55. 
IV. Issues On The Merits 
A. Where the new appraisal approved by SITLA in support of Exchange 188 
based its valuation of the national park land on hypothetical calculations that assumed full 
development of all 640 acres in 40-acre parcels, whether it was unlawful, arbitrary and 
capricious or an abuse of discretion, on administrative appeal, for SITLA and the SITLA 
Board, without substantive explanation, to disregard and refuse to consider: 
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(1) statements of record by the appraiser, and factual allegations and public 
records proffered by NPCA, demonstrating the geographic, economic and regulatory 
infeasibility of the development scenario assumed by the appraisal; and 
(2) the resulting failure of the appraisal to comply with the Uniform Standards 
of Professional Appraisal Practice; and 
(3) obtaining a new or revised appraisal; and 
(4) initiating proceedings for possible alternative dispositions based on revised 
values that may result from a new appraisal. 
B. Whether it was unlawful, arbitrary and capricious, or an abuse of discretion 
for SITLA and the SITLA. Board of Tmstees to rely, as the basis for valuation of the lands 
to be exchanged in Exchange 188 under this Court's remand order, on an appraisal 
described by the appraiser as a "Limited Restricted Use Report" which: 
(1) the appraiser acknowledged "presents no discussions of the data, reasoning, 
and analyses that were used in the appraisal process to develop the appraiser's opinion of 
value," and under "prior agreement with the client" offered only "a limited appraisal 
process in that certain allowable departures from specific guidelines of the Uniform 
Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice were invoked," resulting in his "warning" 
that "the reliability of the value conclusion may be impacted . . . " ; and, 
(2) a second reviewing appraiser described as "specific to the needs of the 
client," did "not contain sufficient information for an unrelated third party to fully 
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understand the report" and therefore "cannot be relied upon by anyone other than the 
client." 
C. Where the new appraisal approved by SITLA on remand from NPCA-I 
concluded that the value of land proffered to SITLA by Garfield County constitutes 
330.5% of the value of land to be received by the County in exchange, 
(a) whether completion of Exchange 188 on the basis of those 
values would constitute an unlawful disposition of County land in violation 
of the requirement under this Court's precedents that the County receive full 
and fair consideration for disposition of its property; and 
(b) whether the terms of this Court's remand in NPCA-I barred 
SITLA from considering or taking any action to address or avert an 
unlawful disposition; and 
(c) whether failure and refusal of SITLA or the SITLA Board to 
reconsider or stay the effectiveness of its approval of the appraisal, or take 
any other action to avert or defer consummation of the land exchange on the 
basis of those disparate values, was unlawful, arbitrary and capricious or an 
abuse of discretion. 
D. Whether, on the basis of its prior claims litigated in NPCA-L supra, NPCA 
is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and the collateral estoppel branch of that doctrine, 
from administrative or judicial challenge to the lawfulness of the excessive consideration 
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that would be conferred by Garfield County if Exchange 188 is consummated on the basis 
of the values disclosed by the new appraisal obtained by SITLA on remand. 
(A) Standards of Review: 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act, U.C.A. 1953, § 63-46b-16(4)(c) ("agency has 
not decided all of the issues requiring resolution"); § 63-46b-16(4)(d) ("agency has 
erroneously interpreted or applied the law"); § 63-46b-16(4)(g) (agency detemiination of 
fact regarding property value "not supported by substantial evidence" on the whole 
record); § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(I) and (iv) (agency action an abuse of discretion, or arbitrary 
and capricious in failing to address or offer rational reasons for disposition of material 
issues) 
(B) Record Preserving The Issue 
(1) NPCA's "Opposition To State of Utah's Motion To Dismiss Appeal Of 
Agency Action In Re. Exchange 188,M at 3, 4, 5, 6-10, 13-15, 16-21,27-28,29-30, 
R.238-245, 248-250, 251-56, 262-63, 264-65.. 
(2) NPCA's "Appellant's Response To Proposed Order" at 2, 5-9, 10-12, 14, 
R. 447, 450-54, 455-57, 459. 
(3) NPCA's initial "Appeal from Final Agency Action By The SITLA Director 
Dated 15 September 2006 In Re Exchange 188" at 1, 5-6, 9-10, R. 28, 32-33, 36-37. 
(4) NPCA's "Preliminary Statement on Behalf of the National Parks 
Conservation Association and William Wolverton Regarding Issues of Fact and Law To 
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Be Determined In The Above Matter" at 3, 6, 7. (Omitted from Record; attached in the 
Addendum.) 
V. Remedial Issues 
Where statements of record by the appraiser, and factual allegations and public 
records proffered by NPC A on administrative appeal raised material questions of fact and 
law about the adequacy of the new appraisal approved by SITLA for Exchange 188 and 
the disparity of values it reported, whether it was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise unlawful for SITLA and the SITLA Board to refuse to consider: 
(a) initiating and obtaining a new and valid appraisal; and 
m l i n i f i o f m r r r*r\r\&ir\£*mt~ir\-n r\T o n o l f a r n o f i T / P ritc>-r\r\Ofi-tr\T\ r\T "H*»£* n o f i A n o l n o r b -
\VJ XXXXLXIXLXXXC, W 1 1 J 1 U V 1 U U U 1 1 V/X U-XX U l t V / l X l U U W VXXOX>\_/OXl.XV/XX V/X LXXV> XXCXIXVJXXU-X JL/CXXJV 
lands, at full and fair value, to an entity committed to protection of the natural, scenic, 
aesthetic and recreational values of that properly in the manner suggested by this Court's 
statement in NPCA-I that "it would be unconscionable not to preserve and protect those 
values" and that the state "may have to consider" transactions that can facilitate protection 
while also ensuring return of "full economic value" to the school trust. 869 P.2d at 921. 
1. Standards of Review 
U.C.A. 1953, § 53C-l-304(4)(b). and § 63-46b-12 (Board decision to be based on 
findings, conclusions and reasons); § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(I) and (iv) (agency action an abuse 
of discretion, arbitrary and capricious in failing to address or offer rational reasons for 
disposition of material issues.) 
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2. Record Preserving The Issue 
(a) NPCA's initial "Appeal from Final Agency Action By The SITLA Director 
Dated 15 September 2006 In Re Exchange 188M at 1-2, 9-10, R. 28-29, 36-37. 
(b) NPCA's "Preliminary Statement on Behalf of the National Parks 
Conservation Association and William Wolverton Regarding Issues of Fact and Law To 
Be Determined In The Above Matter" at 2, 5y 6, 9-10, 11. (Omitted from Record; 
attached in the Addendum.) 
(c) NPCA's "Opposition To State of Utah's Motion To Dismiss Appeal Of 
Agency Action In Re. Exchange 188," at 11-12, 16, 19-23, 30, R. 246-47, 251, 254-58, 
265. 
(d) NPCA's "Appellant's Response To Proposed Order" at 14-15, R. 459-60. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE 
Petitioners submit the following as determinative or of central importance: 
1. Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, Standard Rule 1-2 (The 
Appraisal Foundation, 2006)3 
In developing a real property appraisal, an appraiser must: . . . . 
(e) identify the characteristics of the property that are relevant to the type 
and definition of value and intended use of the appraisal, including (I) its 
location and physical, legal and economic attributes;.... [and] (iv) any 
3
 Available on Appraisal Foundation web site at: 
http://www.appraisalfoundation.org/s_appraisal/sec.asp?CID=3&DID=,3, at the following link: 
http://commerce.appraisalfoundation.org/html/2006%20USPAP/stdl.htm. 
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known easements, restrictions, encumbrances, leases, reservations, 
covenants, contracts, declarations, special assessments, ordinances, or other 
items of a similar nature; and 
(f) identify an extraordinary assumptions necessary to the assignment [which must 
have "a reasonable basis" and must be disclosed]. 
2. U.C.A. § 63-46b-U4): 
This chapter does not preclude an agency, prior to the beginning of an adjudicative 
proceeding, or the presiding officer during an adjudicative proceeding from: . . . 
(B) granting a timely motion to dismiss or for summary judgment if the 
requirements of Rule 12(b) or Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil procedure are met 
by the moving party, except to the extent that the requirements of those rules are 
modified by this chapter. 
3. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 12(b): 
How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, 
whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted 
in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following 
defense may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: . . . . (6) failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves a Petition for Review appealing an order by the Board of 
Trustees ("SITLA Board") of the State Institutional and Trust Lands Administration 
("SITLA") that dismissed an NPCA administrative appeal. The appeal challenged SITLA 
approval of a new (2005) appraisal obtained to support exchange of a section of school 
trust land within4 Capitol Reef National Park ("Park Section 16") for land proffered by 
4
 Legal description in NPCA-L 869 P.2d at 911; and in the minutes of SITLA's final 
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Garfield County ("Exchange 188"), previously at issue in National Parks and 
Conservation Association v. Board of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909 (1993) ("NPCA-I"). 
That decision invalidated a prior appraisal arranged by the County and relied on by the 
Division of State Lands as the valuation basis for Exchange 188. The Court remanded to 
the Division, ordered an independent appraisal, and stayed further action on the exchange 
pending compliance, as follows: 
We remand this case to the Division for a determination of whether the 
appraised values of section 16 and the Garfield County lands offered in 
exchange represent the full value of those lands. 
The stay presently in effect will continue until the Division makes the 
requisite determinations that the value of the land exchanged for section 16 
is adequate under its trust obligations. 
869P.2dat923. 
This Petition seeks review of the SITLA Board's order dated September 13, 2007, 
dismissing NPCA's administrative appeal that asserted various challenges to SITLA's 
approval of a new appraisal in support of Exchange 188 following the above remand. The 
order dismissed certain claims on the merits and denied NPCA's standing to assert other 
claims. 
agency action at issue in this appeal described as "Section 16, Township 34 South, Range 8 
East, SLB & M." See "Exchange 188 (value and records update on remand from the 
Utah Supreme Court)," Exhibit H, SITLA Motion To Dismiss, R 187, 189. 
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B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Following the 1993 remand in NPCA-I and a follow-up NPCA request for notice 
and opportunity to intervene in the remanded appraisal proceedings, no action was taken 
until a new appraisal was arranged by SITLA in 2005, submitted by the appraiser on 
August 25, 2005. Following receipt of the appraisal in Spring 2006, NPCA's counsel 
submitted objections to SITLA challenging the adequacy and reliability of the appraisal, 
as well as the lawfulness of the consideration to be received by Garfield County. When 
SITLA rejected NPCA's objections and approved the appraisal as satisfying the remand 
order in NPCA-L an administrative appeal was filed by NPCA with the SITLA Board. 
After preliminary submissions regarding disputed issues of fact and law, SITLA 
submitted a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State Cause of Action, R. 90. ("Motion to 
Dismiss.") Without further fact proceedings, following further briefing and oral 
arguments, the SITLA Board on September 13, 2007, entered an Order: (1) Separating 
Adjudicative Proceedings; (2) Granting State's Motion to Dismiss Appeal of Agency 
Action in Re Exchange No. 188; and (3) Continuing Consideration of Request for 
Rulemaking. R. 516 ("Order"). That Order also separated and continued proceedings in 
a previously consolidated appeal from denial of a related NPCA Rulemaking petition. 
C. DISPOSITION BELOW 
All claims asserted by NPCA's administrative appeal from SITLA's approval of 
the new McConkie appraisal were dismissed by final Order of the SITLA Board. Certain 
13 
claims were dismissed on the merits while other claims were dismissed on the ground that 
SITLA lacked standing to assert the claim. The Order also separated NPCA's appeal 
from denial of its Petition for Rulemaking, continuing its consideration to a later date. 
NPCA has not contested continuance of its Rulemaking appeal; but it expressly reserved 
its claims regarding the pertinence of the proposed Rulemaking remedies to its appraisal 
appeal. 
D, STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. NPCA Request for Notice of Appraisal Proceedings Following 
NPCA-L 
On July 1, 1993, shortly after the decision in NPCA-L counsel for NPCA 
submitted to the Division of State Lands a "Notice of Intervention by National Parks and 
Conservation Association in All Proceedings Relating to Land Appraisal and 
determination of adequacy of Value to The School Trust in Land Exchange Proposed by 
Garfield County for County acquisition of Section 16 [etc.]." The Notice asserted NPCA's 
"right of intervention in the Garfield County land exchange proceedings on the issue 
concerning the Division's duties with regard to an appraisal. . . ." and requested notice of 
all actions initiated to comply with the Court's remand, as well as access to copies of all 
related correspondence and documents. Appellants' Response to Proposed Order at 3-4, 
and attached Exhibit A, R. 448-49, 463. SITLA made no response to that notice and 
request, and NPCA received no notice of a new appraisal until after it was completed and 
pending before SITLA. Transcript of Hearing Proceedings, September 13, 2007, p. 
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27-28, R. 504-05. NPCA has not sought active participation in the current appraisal 
proceedings, which occurred without notice to NPCA. But NPCA has claimed a limited 
right to SITLA consideration of its objections to the adequacy and reliability of the new 
appraisal at issue in this matter, and to the unlawfulness of consideration for the land 
exchange disclosed by that appraisal. 
2. New Appraisal, NPCA Objections and SITLA. Approval. 
On August 25, 2005, an appraisal opinion was submitted to SITLA by Stanford S. 
McConkie, of Morley & McConkie, L.C. "Limited Restricted Use Report: Appraisal of 
Three Parcels of Land Located in Garfield County and Two Industrial Lots Located in 
Richfield Sevier County, Utah," ("McConkie Appraisal"), Exhibit B, Motion to Dismiss, 
R. 132. The McConkie Appraisal valued the trust land in Capitol Reef National Park, 
Park Section 16, at $200,000, while it valued the lands to be exchanged therefor by 
Garfield County at $661,200, R. 155. Informal notice of that appraisal was provided to 
NPCA in late 2005; but no copy was provided until May or June 2006. (Date not 
determined on the record; but, on information and belief, the exact date is not disputed or 
material.) 
On August 29, 2006, NPCA's counsel submitted a letter to SITLA raising the 
objections to the accuracy, adequacy and reliability of the McConkie Appraisal that were 
subsequently presented by NPCA's administrative appeal. The letter emphasized that the 
appraisal "significantly overstates the proper fair value of the school section." Even at the 
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appraised values, the letter asserted, SITLA will receive "excessive return exceeding fair 
value" which "is inappropriate where the transaction will have the effect of defeating the 
protective strategies endorsed by the Supreme Court in [NPCA-I]." The letter contended 
that a proper appraisal would reflect a lower value for Park Section 16, thereby presenting 
"opportunity for a range of options . . . for disposition of the property that will at once 
return fair value and ensure protection." Exhibit C, SITLA Motion to Dismiss, R. 162. 
NPCA counsel's letter also submitted an "Appraisal Review" by Appraisers J. 
Philip Cook and Virginia H. Hylton that had been prepared for another entity ( Southern 
Utah Wilderness Alliance). While expressing no approval or endorsement of an 
alternative valuation methodology favored by the reviewers, NPCA's letter highlighted the 
Appraisal Review description of specific and admitted "Limited Restricted Use" 
limitations also acknowledged by the McConkie appraisal. The Appraisal Review 
emphasized that the "Restricted Use Appraisal Report" (The McConkie Appraisal) — 
* presents "no discussions of the data, reasoning, and analysis that were used in the 
appraisal process"; 
* withheld "[supporting documentation concerning the data, reasoning and 
analysis" which were "retained in the appraiser's files"; 
* invoked "certain allowable departures from specific guidelines of the Uniform 
Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice." 
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In short, NPCA emphasized that the appraisal review found limited disclosure of 
appraisal data and analyses, and that McConkie admitted lack of "sufficient information 
for an unrelated third party to fully understand the report." Indeed, McConkie had even 
warned, in the appraisal document, that "the reliability of the value conclusion provided 
may be impacted." NPCA's letter for concluded: 
While such an appraisal may serve undisclosed purposes of a client, it 
cannot be sufficient where important public interests are likely to be 
significantly adversely affected by the appraisal . . . [N] either NPCA nor 
other members of the public have any way of assessing the reliability, 
accuracy or possible motivations for the deviations from full disclosure and 
standard practices acknowledged [in the McConkie appraisal]. Nor is it 
possible to be sure that the appraisal avoided the "sharp practices" or other 
irrelevancies of concern to the Supreme court in this matter, or that the 
appraisal actually represented "fair value." . . . . 
Letter, Wayne G. Petty to Kevin Carter, August 29, 2006, Exhibit C, Motion to 
Dismiss, R. 162, discussing "Appraisal Review (A Portion) Of Moreley & MConkie, 
L.C., Sanford S. McConkie, MAI Appraisal Dated August 25, 2005" by appraisers J. 
Philip Cook and Virginia H. Hylton (July 25, 2006), Motion to Dismiss Exhibit D, R. 169. 
On September 15, 2006, the Director of SITLA took final agency action accepting 
and approving the McConkie Appraisal. Based on the reported valuations, he determined 
that the "value ratio" of 330.5% ($661,000/$200,000) reflected in that appraisal "remains 
acceptable, for purposes of compliance with the Utah Supreme Court's order in the NPCA 
case." Minutes, final agency action of SITLA Director Kevin S. Carter, September 15, 
2006, Exhibit H, Motion to Dismiss, R 187-190. 
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3. Administrative Appeal from SITLA Approval of the McConkie 
Appraisal as Satisfying the Remand order in NPCA-L and 
Subsequent Proceedings 
On September 29, 2006, NPCA and an individual NPCA member William 
Wolverton filed with the SITLA Board an administrative appeal from the SITLA 
Director's decision approving the McConkie appraisal as the basis for consummation of 
Exchange 188. Appeal From Final Agency Action by The SITLA Director dated 15 
September 2006 In Re Exchange 188, R. 28. The appeal contended that the McConkie 
appraisal was inadequate and unreliable on several grounds: 
a. Failure of the Appraisal Methodology to Consider Material 
Topographic, Economic and Regulatory Factors Pertinent to 
Valuation: 
NPCA's appeal challenged the adequacy of the appraisal because it failed to 
consider significant development constraints resulting from topography, national park 
regulatory restrictions and unavailability of water and power service. The appeal 
contended these constraints would render infeasible the kind of development relied on by 
the appraisal as the basis for its value calculations. These calculations assumed that all 
640 acres of Park Section 16 could be sold in 40-acre parcels at a uniform price, for a total 
valuation of $200,000. Exhibit B at 13, Motion to Dismiss, R. 153. Relying on maps 
available in SITLA's files, on National Park Service documents, adjudicated cases, and 
the appraiser's own significant admissions recited in the appraisal report, NPCA offered to 
show and argued that: 
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(i) the appraisal failed to consider that substantial portions of Park Section 16 
involved very steep topography not subject to development; 
(ii) any development on the property would be subject to severe regulatory 
constraints under statutes, regulations and implementing case law protecting national 
parks, and specifically applicable to the land in question; and 
(iii) the property lacked any utility services or water access, and faced similar 
regulatory constraints in obtaining those services. 
The appeal emphasized that even the McConkie Appraisal had contradicted the 
basis for its valuation calculations by acknowledging that Park Section 16 "has limited 
utility, if any," because "[tjhis parcel consists of land that is very irregular in terrain, with 
steep sandstone cliffs and rocky terrain as well as some limited open space." MConkie 
appraisal at 3 (Parcel No. 3), Exhibit B. Motion to Dismiss, R. 143. None of these 
constraints were reflected or considered in the Appraisal's recited basis for valuation. 
These failures, NPCA contended, rendered the McConkie appraisal inadequate to 
provide the reliable basis for valuation required by the Court in NPCA-I. Appeal From 
Final Agency Action by The SITLA Director Dated 15 September 1006 In Re Exchange 
188, at 7-9, R. 34-36. 
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b. Fact Issues Framed to Address Development Constraints and 
Natural Values on Park Section 16 
The development constraints and natural values of Park Section 16 were further 
asserted in NPCA's preliminary identification of material fact issues to be determined in 
the administrative appeal, including: 
* the steepness of the terrain within Section 16 and the extent of land and building 
sites with slopes at low enough gradient to permit feasible and lawful access and 
construction; 
* whether the McConkie appraisal, or SITLA in approving it, actually determined 
that despite the steep terrain, all of the 640 acres of Section 16 were feasible for 
development and susceptible for sale in 40-acre lots as recited in the appraisal; 
* whether McConkie in preparing the appraisal, or SITLA in approving it, made 
any determination regarding the effect on land values resulting from the steepness of the 
terrain or the absence of water and utilities; 
* whether McConkie in preparing the appraisal, or SITLA in approving it, made 
any inquiries, investigations or determinations regarding applicable regulatory restrictions 
governing construction on and use of the land within Section 16 arising from National 
Park Service authority for protection of Capitol Reef National Park, or the effect of any 
such restrictions on land values. Preliminary Statement on Behalf of the National Parks 
Conservation Association and William Wolverton Regarding Issues of Fact and Law to 
be Determined in the Above Matter, at 5. (Omitted from Record; attached in Addendum.) 
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NPCA also submitted extensive references to official documents demonstrating the 
unique and important natural values of Park Section 16 and the substantial regulatory 
constraints limiting any development on the section. These included U.S. National Park 
Service management plan documents, and the analysis of regulatory authority and order 
entered by the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah in United States and National 
Parks and Conservation Association v. Garfield County and State of Utah. 122 F.Supp.2d 
1201 (2000). See "Appellants' Supplemental Statement of Facts" and Annexes inNPCA's 
"Opposition to State of Utah's Motion to Dismiss Appeal of Agency Action In Re: 
Exchange 188 And Request for Rulemaking/' at 6-10, R. 241-245. 
c. Failure of the McConkie "Limited Restricted Use Report" to 
Disclose or Explain Underlying Data, Analyses and 
Assumptions, and Restrictions on the Scope of the Appraisal 
as Agreed Between McConkie and SITLA 
NPCA's appeal also contended that the appraisal provided an unreliable basis for 
valuation because it was a "Limited Restricted Use Report" which even the appraiser 
acknowledged "presents no discussions of the data, reasoning, and analyses that were used 
in the appraisal process to develop the appraiser's opinion of value." The appraiser also 
acknowledged that, under "prior agreement with the client," the appraisal utilized only "a 
limited appraisal process in that certain allowable departures from specific guidelines of 
the Uniform Standards of Processional Appraisal Practice were invoked." The "allowable 
departures" from appraisal standards were not identified; but the appraisal warned "that 
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the reliability of the value conclusion may be impacted . . . ." McConkie Appraisal at 1-2, 
Exhibit B. Motion to Dismiss, R 141-42. 
The unreliability of the "Limited Restricted Use Report" and its inadequacy to 
permit public review were also emphasized in an Appraisal Review by Appraisers J. Philip 
Cook and Virginia H. Hylton, submitted to SITLA by NPCA. They described this type of 
report as "specific to the needs of the client", explaining that it does "not contain sufficient 
information for an unrelated third party to fully understand the report" and therefore 
"cannot be relied upon by anyone other than the client." "Appraisal Review (A Portion) 
Of Moreley & MConkie, L.C., Sanford S. McConkie, MAI Appraisal Dated August 25, 
2005" by appraisers J. Philip Cook and Virginia H. Hylton (July 25, 2006), at 2-3, Exhibit 
D, Motion to Dismiss, R. 170-171. 
d. Disparity of Value of the Exchange Properties Raising 
Questions Regarding the Lawfulness of Consideration to be 
Received by Garfield County 
NPCA also challenged the lawfulness of the land exchange if it were consummated 
on the basis of the values reported by the appraisal. Because the lands to be conveyed by 
Garfield County were admittedly appraised at 330.5% of the value of the Park land the 
County would receive, NPCA contended that the exchange would violate the requirement 
under this Court's precedents that the County must receive full and fair consideration for 
disposition of its property. Recognizing doubt that SITLA or the SITLA Board had 
authority to directly void the transaction or invalidate the deeds previously exchanged in 
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December 1992, NPCA proposed a number of other steps within SITLA's authority that 
could be taken, such as suspending approval of the McConkie appraisal pending further 
steps to avoid an illegal transaction. Appellants Response to Proposed Order at 11, R. 
456. 
e. Request for SITLA to Consider Feasible Steps for Protection 
of National Park Noneconomic Values on Park Section 16 
Which Could Return Fair Value to the School Trust. 
Finally, NPCA requested that SITLA take steps to obtain a new appraisal in lieu of 
the inadequate McConkie appraisal, and to consider an alternative disposition responsive 
to the Utah Supreme Court's concerns in NPCA-I regarding protection of unique 
noneconomic values on trust lands. Specifically, NPCA's appeal requested the SITLA 
Board to: 
(i) disapprove the McConkie appraisal; 
(ii) defer further action on the appraisal and exchange pending SITLA and 
Board determinations regarding Board or judicial action to invalidate any conveyances 
effected on the basis of defective or unreliable appraisals; and 
(iii) defer further action on the appraisal and exchange pending SITLA and 
Board consideration and determinations regarding feasible alternative processes for 
protection of trust lands having unique natural values, as urged by this Court in NPCA-I; 
and 
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(iv) initiate a new appraisal that adequately reflects the development limitations 
on Park Section 16; and, 
(v) initiate consideration of a possible alternative negotiated transaction for a 
protective disposition of Park Section 16 in lieu of Exchange 188, on terms that would 
also assure fair value to the school trust. NPCA, Appeal from Final Agency Action at 2, 
R.29. 
f. Grounds for Standing Asserted by Appellants NPCA and 
Wolverton 
NPCA and Wolverton asserted extensive and undisputed allegations and 
submissions regarding multiple bases for their standing to litigate the above claims before 
SITLA and the SITLA Board, including: 
(1) NPCA members' active and continuing use and enjoyment of Park Section 
16 and the affected areas of Capitol Reef National Park, including use and protective 
advocacy by individual member and appellant, William Wolverton. 
(2) Appellant William Wolverton's own personal interest as a Garfield County 
property taxpayer in avoiding unlawful disposition of County property without fair 
consideration; 
(3) NPCA's extensive activity in litigation and related advocacy directed to 
protection of Capitol Reef National Park, and successful resistance to Garfield County 
efforts to pave the Burr Trail which transects Park Section 16 and affects the immediate 
area of the trust land in question, demonstrating: (I) NPCA's own active interest, as an 
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entity and conservation organization, in protection of Section 16; and (ii) the public 
importance of the current issues regarding protection of Section 16 that NPCA seeks to 
raise, as reflected in the substantiality of its involvement in prior extensive litigation and 
other action to protect Section 16 and adjacent areas; 
(4) NPCA claimed injury arising from the inadequate and inaccurate appraisal, 
and unlawful consideration by Garfield County because: (I) approval of the McConkie 
appraisal may consummate the exchange transaction, making it likely that Section 16 will 
be subject to development actions by Garfield County likely to damage its natural values: 
and (ii) the inadequacies of the appraisal resulted in excessive valuation of the Section 16, 
which inhibits opportunity for individual conservation entities to negotiate a fair value 
price at which an alternative protective disposition of the property can be structured; 
(5) The immediate probability of the injury to NPCA's above interests from 
Garfield County development activities is demonstrated by record submissions of 
communications from the National Park Service, including pictures showing County use 
of a bulldozer to clear a substantial area within Park Section 16 in April 2006, even before 
SITLA approval of the McConkie appraisal, while the stay entered in NPCA-I remained 
in effect. Appendix to Appeal From Final Agency Action by The SITLA Direcrtor Dated 
15 September 2006 In Re Exchange 188, at 5, and Appendix, R 32, 38-43. 
(6) NPCA's standing assertions also included claims for remedies that offer a 
substantial likelihood of redressing the above injuries, including (I) SITLA withdrawal or 
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suspension of its approval of the McConkie appraisal; (ii) SITLA arrangements for a 
proper and adequate appraisal to establish a fair value for Section 16 that reflects the 
substantial constraints on development disregarded by the McConkie appraisal; (iii) 
SITLA initiation of a process for considering and structuring a transaction for acquisition 
of Section 16, at fair value, by an entity committed to protection of the noneconomic 
values of Park Section 16. NPCA, Appeal From Final Agency Action at 2, R.29. 
4. SITLA'S Dismissal of NPCA's Claims and Standing 
On September 13, 2007, the SITLA Board entered its final order dismissing all 
claims presented by NPCA's administrative appeal from SITLA's approval of the new 
McConkie appraisal. Certain claims were dismissed on the merits, while other claims 
were dismissed on the ground that SITLA lacked standing to assert the claim. The order 
also separated NPCA's administrative appeal from denial of its Petition for Rulemaking, 
continuing that appeal to a later date. 
a. Dismissed on the Merits: Claim of Inadequate Consideration 
to Garfield County 
The SITLA Board's dismissal Order admitted, as a matter of law, that "local 
governments may not dispose of real property without adequate compensation," but 
nevertheless dismissed that claim on the merits. The Board held that determination of that 
issue was beyond the scope of the Court's remand in NPCA-I; that the Board lacked 
authority to determine the illegality or to adjudicate the earlier conveyance; and that 
NPCA was barred by res judicata from raising issues bearing on the disparity of values in 
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the exchange. It gave no consideration to steps suggested by NPCA, or any other 
alternative steps, that SITLA or the SITLA Board could take to address the problem of 
unlawful insufficiency of consideration. Order: (1) Separating Adjudicative Proceedings; 
(2) Granting State's Motion to Dismiss Appeal of Agency Action In Re Exchange No. 
188; and (3) Continuing Consideration of Request for Rulemaking" at 11-13, R. 526-528. 
b. Dismissed on the Merits: Claims Regarding the Legal 
Adequacy of The "Limited Restricted Use Report" Submitting 
the McConkie Appraisal 
The SITLA Board held that the McConkie Limited Restricted Use Report was 
"sufficient to meet the Supreme Court's mandate [in NPCA-I]. . . to determine 
independently . . . whether full compensation had been achieved by the school trust" and is 
appropriate under appraisal practice "[w]hen the intended users do not include parties 
other than the cl ient . . . ." Order at 13-17, R. 528-532. The Order acknowledged that the 
Limited Restricted Use Report "departed in some respects from specific USPAP 
guidelines" which "could impact the reliability of the value conclusions," But the Order 
did not review any of the acknowledged omissions of data or analysis. It did not address 
any exclusions from the report acknowledged to have been agreed between McConkie and 
SITLA. And it did not consider whether failure to disclose these factors affected the 
independence of the appraiser's opinion, or the accuracy or reliability of the appraisal, or 
its validity as the basis for transactions affecting school trust properties. The Order 
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dismissed these concerns because "[t]he Supreme Court's directive was for an 
independent review of valuation, which was accomplished." Id. 
c. Dismissed for Lack of NPCA Standing: All Claims of 
Inadequate Consideration of Topography and Regulatory 
Constraints 
Holding that NPCA, as a "third party" had no right to intervene in the remanded 
appraisal matter, the Board interpreted NPCA-I as articulating "the sound policy for 
denying third party intervention into executive real property decisions." On that basis, the 
SITLA Board's Order dismissed, for lack of standing, all of NPCA claims and 
submissions asserting failure of the McConkie appraisal to address the topographical, 
economic and regulator}7 constraints identified in NPCA's submissions. It concluded "The 
Board finds that, on remand, the Petitioners do not have standing to attack SITLA's 
substantive internal decision making concerning the specific values of the lands 
committed to a state land exchange." Order at 17, R. 532. 
In so ruling, the Board Order did not address this Court's express recognition of 
NPCA's right of "limited intervention" to attack the appraisal supplied by the County in 
NPCA-I, 869 P.2d at 922, n. 11, erroneously asserting without qualification that the Court 
had "specifically denied NPCA the right to intervene in the exchange transaction." Nor 
did the Board explain whether or how consideration of the concrete inadequacies asserted 
by NPCA would interfere with "executive real property decisions," Order at 16, R 531, or 
why insulation from scrutiny of such material omissions was necessary to effective 
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executive judgment. Rather, it held that NPCA lacked standing to raise or present these 
concerns and should be denied "third party intervention into executive real property 
decisions." Id. 
Although the Board recognized that its standard of review required it to "construe 
the pleadings in the light most favorable to the Petitioners," it gave no consideration or 
weight to NPCA's submissions regarding the topographical, regulatory and economic 
constraints disregarded by the McConkie appraisal. Finding "contradiction" in NPCA's 
assertions that the consideration to the County would be inadequate and that Park Section 
16 was arguably overvalued, the Board decided that it "need not resolve these 
inconsistencies" because of NPCA's lack of standing. Order at 16, R. 531. It thus did not 
consider NPCA's further claim - not requiring intrusion into executive discretion- that a 
probable lower valuation of Park Section 16 might demonstrate a still more severely 
inadequate consideration to the County, potentially enhancing the feasibility of an 
alternative protective disposition as urged by NPCA. 
d. Dismissed on the Merits: NPCA's claim that in considering 
remedies for the inadequate McConkie appraisal and unlawful 
consideration to Garfield County, the Board should consider 
alternatives that respond to this Court's guidance in NPCA-I 
regarding the need to protect natural noneconomic values on 
unique trust lands. 
The SITLA Board rejected any pertinence or applicability to this appeal of this 
Court's emphasis on the above concerns in NPCA-L explaining that the opinion had found 
those concerns satisfied by the Division of State Lands. Order at 17-18, R. 532-33. On 
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that ground, it declined any consideration of a remedy for the inadequacies of the 
McConkie Appraisal involving possible alternative protective dispositions with fair value 
to the school trust based on obtaining of a reliable new appraisal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
NPCA contends that its Appeal From Final Agency Action . . . In Re Exchange 
188, R. 28, states a claim because: 
(1) The McConkie appraisal is inadequate on its face because it utterly failed to 
address material development constraints that would diminish valuation of Park Section 
16, including extensive precipitous topography, severe regulatory restrictions and lack of 
water and electrical services. That failure also renders the appraisal inadequate under 
authoritative requirements of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice. 
Further the Mcconkie Appraisal is internally inconsistent, stating that Park Section 16 "has 
limited utility, if any" because "[t]his parcel consists of land that is very irregular in 
terrain, with steep sandstone cliffs and rocky terrain as well as some limited open space," 
while concluding 16 40-acre parcels could be developed. 
(2) The appraisal fails to meet this Court's requirements for a "reliable 
appraisal" that ensure " that trusts are properly administered" and fulfill "the overriding 
public interest in the proper administration of the school land trust," 869 P.2d at 921-22, 
because, as a "Limited Restricted Use Report," the McConkie Appraisal relied on 
undisclosed terms of agreement with SITLA and failed to disclose the basic data and 
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analyses on which it relied, causing even the appraiser to warn that "that the reliability of 
the value conclusion may be impacted . . . ." 
(3) The appraisal's conclusions, if correct, acknowledged that the lands 
conveyed by Garfield County were valued at 330.5% of the value attributed to the Park 
Section it would receive, constituting a clear violation of this Court's precedents requiring 
counties to receive "adequate consideration" for disposition of their properties. Though 
without authority to invalidate deeds, SITLA had ample administrative power to initiate 
interim steps toward correction, including reconsideration and withdrawal of its approval 
of the appraisal and deferral of further action pending acquisition of a reliable appraisal, as 
well as initiating renegotiation of the transaction or commencing litigation challenge. 
(4) Assertion of the claims regarding inadequate consideration were not barred 
by res judicata or collateral estoppel be cause the McConkie appraisal presented entirely 
new facts, and the issue was neither decided nor litigated in NPCA-L 
(5) SITLA should have sought a new appraisal providing a reliable valuation of 
Park Section 16, and thereafter should have initiated proceedings to consider the 
feasibility and possible structure of an alternative disposition, at fair value, to an entity 
committed to protecting the noneconomic "unique scenic, paleontological, and 
archeological values" of the Section in accordance with this Court's guidance in NPCA-L 
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ARGUMENT 
In this matter, NPCA has challenged SITLA's erroneous approval of an inadequate 
appraisal on remand from NPCA-L and seeks relief grounded in sound agency judgment 
and discretion responsive to this Court's guidance urging that to protected "unique scenic, 
paleontological, and archeological values" which "it would be unconscionable not to 
preserve and protect... the state may have to consider exchanging public trust lands or 
other state lands for school lands." NPCA-L 869 P.2d at 920-21. 
NPCA asserted the arguments below in support of its administrative appeal seeking 
SITLA's consideration of an alternative to the disposition of Park Section 16 effected by 
Exchange 188, emphasizing the inadequacy and unreliability of the McConkie appraisal, 
and the unlawful lack of consideration for disposition of Garfield County land that it 
disclosed. 
L THE McCONKIE APPRAISAL DISREGARDED MATERIAL 
FACTORS OF TOPOGRAPHY, REGULATORY CONSTRAINTS AND 
UNAVAILABILITY OF KEY SERVICES; NPCA HAS STANDING TO 
ASSERT THOSE CLAIMS. 
The McConkie "Restricted Use Appraisal" was clearly inadequate to satisfy the 
remand in NPCA v. Board of State Lands because its valuation calculations presumed full 
development of all 40-acre parcels in Park Section 16. R. 153. In doing so, it gave no 
consideration to the large portions of that Section comprised of extremely steep 
topography, the regulatory constraints likely to limit development, or the actual 
unavailability of water or electric utility service. Failure to consider these factors 
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disregarded basic appraisal standards and rules under the Uniform Standards of 
Professional Appraisal Practice, Standard Rule 1-25 with which the appraisal claimed to 
comply, including the following: 
In developing a real property appraisal, an appraiser must: 
(e) identify the characteristics of the property that are relevant to the type and 
definition of value and intended use of the appraisal, including (I) its location and 
physical legal and economic attributes:.... [and] (iv) any known easements, 
restrictions, encumbrances, leases, reservations, covenants, contracts, declarations, 
special assessments, ordinances, or other items of a similar nature; and 
(f) identify an extraordinary assumptions6 necessary to the assignment [which 
must have "a reasonable basis" and must be disclosed]. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Neither SITLA nor the SITLA Board's dismissal order ever addressed the key 
factors identified by NPCA as disregarded by the appraisal. Nor did it address the express 
admission in the McConkie appraisal that "this parcel consists of land that is very irregular 
in terrain with steep sandstone cliffs and rocky terrain as well as some limited open 
space," and that it "has limited utility, if any." Exhibit B at 3. 6, R. 143, 146. Purporting 
to "assume for the purposes of the pending motion that NPCA's assertions are correct," 
5
 Promulgated by The Appraisal Foundation, available at the Appraisal Foundation 
web site, http://www.appraisalfoundation.org/s_appraisal/sec.asp?CID=3&DID=,3 at the 
following link: http://commerce.appraisalfoundation.org/html/2006%20USPAP/stdl .htm. 
6
 The Definition Section of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal 
Practice defines an "extraordinary assumption" as "an assumption, directly related to a 
specific assignment, which, if found to be false, could alter the appraiser's opinions or 
conclusions." A Comment accompanying the section explains that "Extraordinary 
assumptions presume as fact otherwise uncertain information about physical, legal, or 
economic characteristics of the subject property . . . . " 
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the Board simply asserted that "NPCA's factual contentions on valuation issues are so 
contradictory as to be impossible to reconcile," while ignoring NPCA's actual contention: 
that these facts further intensify the unlawful value disparities of Exchange 188. Rather, 
the Board simply concluded that it "need not resolve these inconsistencies" because 
NPCA lacks standing to intervene in exchange transactions. Order at 15-17, R. 530-32. 
On that basis, without further explanation, the SITLA Board disregarded the relevance, 
materiality and valuation significance of matters that professional appraisal standards treat 
as central to an adequate and proper appraisal. 
In dismissing this claim for lack of standing, the SITLA Board, apparently 
unwittingly, disregarded its admitted obligation, under its applicable review standards, to 
assume the correctness of NPCA'S allegations. If NPCA's allegations - both the material 
factors claimed and their disregard by the McConkie appraisal - were accepted as correct 
for purposes of dismissal, then it was irrelevant and unlawful to erect "standing" as a bar 
to their consideration. No standing to intervene in the appraisal proceedings was 
necessary: the issue presented was whether the facts asserted by NPCA, "assumed" to be 
correct but disregarded by the appraisal, required new consideration and judgment by 
SITLA and the SITLA Board. That determination could be made by the agency without 
NPCA's actual participation in further appraisal proceedings. Moreover, apart from any 
limitations on intervention, SITLA has not challenged NPCA's standing to raise these 
questions under its recent standing jurisprudence in Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Board 
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and Sevier Power Co.. 2006 UT 74, 148 P.3d 960 (2006); Utah Chapter of the Sierra 
Club, v. Utah Air Quality Board and Intemiountain Power Service Corp.. 2006 UT 73, 148 
P.3d 975 (2006). 
II. AS A "LIMITED RESTRICTED USE REPORT," THE McCONKIE 
APPRAISAL FAILED TO FULFILL THIS COURT'S REQUIREMENTS 
FOR A "RELIABLE APPRAISAL," 
The McConkie appraisal also provided an unreliable basis for valuation because it 
was a "Limited Restricted Use Report" which even the appraiser acknowledged "presents 
no discussions of the data, reasoning, and analyses that were used in the appraisal process 
to develop the appraiser's opinion of value." McConkie Appraisal, 1-2, Exhibit B to 
SITLA Motion to Dismiss, R, 141-42. The appraiser acknowledged that, under an 
undisclosed "prior agreement with the client," the appraisal utilized only "a limited 
appraisal process in that certain allowable departures from specific guidelines of the 
Uniform Standards of Processional Appraisal Practice were invoked." Although the 
"departures" from appraisal standards were not identified, the appraisal warned "that the 
reliability of the value conclusion may be impacted . . . .Id. at 1-2, R. 141-42. 
The unreliability of this kind of appraisal report for public assurance and review 
were also emphasized in the Appraisal Review by Appraisers J. Philip Cook and Virginia 
H. Hylton submitted by NPCA. They described this type of report as "specific to the 
needs of the client, "explaining that it does "not contain sufficient information for an 
unrelated third party to fully understand the report" and therefore "cannot be relied upon 
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by anyone other than the client." "Appraisal Review (A Portion) Of Moreley & 
McConkie, L.C., Sanford S. McConkie, MAI Appraisal Dated August 25, 2005" by 
appraisers J. Philip Cook and Virginia H. Hylton (July 25, 2006) at 1-2, Exhibit D to 
SITLA Motion to Dismiss, R. 170-71. 
While expressing no approval or endorsement of an alternative valuation 
methodology favored by the reviewers, NPCA's appeal emphasized that the unreliability 
of the McConkie Restricted Use Appraisal Report is inherent in its departures from 
appraisal transparency highlighted by the Appraisal review and admitted by the McConkie 
appraisal itself. In summary, NPCA emphasized that it: 
* presented "no discussions of the data, reasoning, and analysis that were used in 
the appraisal process"; 
* withheld "[supporting documentation concerning the data, reasoning and 
analysis" which were "retained in the appraiser's files"; 
* invoked "certain allowable departures from specific guidelines of the Uniform 
Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice"; and 
* required a warning in the appraisal document itself that "the reliability of the 
value conclusion provided may be impacted"; and 
* presented so little appraisal data and analyses that the Appraisal Review 
emphasized that it lacked "sufficient infomiation for an unrelated third party to fully 
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understand the report." Letter from NPCA Counsel to Kevin S. Carter, August 29, 2006 
at 3, R. 164; Appeal from Final Agency Action at 6-7, R. 33-34. 
Although such an appraisal may serve undisclosed purposes of a client, it cannot be 
sufficient where important public interests are likely to be significantly adversely affected 
by the appraisal. Neither NPCA nor other members of the public had any way of assessing 
the reliability or accuracy of the infonnation or analysis, or the reasons for deviation from 
full disclosure and standard appraisal practices. Lacking basic transparency, it was 
impossible for the public - or any reviewers - to ensure that the appraisal avoided the 
"sharp practices" or other irrelevancies of concern to the Supreme court in ordering a new 
appraisal in NPCA-I, 869 P.2d at 922. 
III. THE ADMITTED 330.5% DISPARITY BETWEEN THE CONSIDERATION 
GIVEN AND THAT RECEIVED BY GARFIELD COUNTY, IF ACCEPTED 
AS CORRECT, DISCLOSES AN UNLAWFUL TRANSACTION UNDER 
THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS WHICH COULD INITIALLY HAVE BEEN 
ADDRESSED BY INTERIM MEASURES WITHIN SITLA AUTHORITY 
TO INITIATE. 
Seeking SITLA reconsideration of the Exchange 188 disposition of Park Section 
16, NPCA's administrative appeal argued not only that the McConkie appraisal was 
inadequate and unreliable, but also that the disparity of values it attributed to the exchange 
properties demonstrated clear unlawfulness of the transaction. Moreover, that disparity 
would surely be wider if the inadequacies of the appraisal emphasized above had been 
properly considered. 
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The SITLA Board acknowledged the 330.5% disparity of values, and that NPCA 
was "correct" in arguing that "local governments may not dispose of real property without 
adequate compensation." It specifically acknowledged the controlling authority of that 
requirement, established under Municipal Building Authority of Iron County v. Lowder, 
711 P.2d 273 (Utah 1985) and Salt Lake County Comfn v. Salt Lake Co. Atty. 1999 UT 
73, 985 P.2d 899, relying on Sears v. Ogden City. Utah, 533 P.2d 118 (1975); cf. Price 
Development Co., L.P. v. Orem City. 2000 UT 26, 995 P.2d 1237.7 Order at 11, R. 526. 
Nonetheless, the Board dismissed NPCA's appeal, relying on a rigidly narrow 
interpretation of the remand order in NPCA-I, asserting that the order barred it from 
considering the unlawfulness of consideration. The Board contended that the remand 
confined SITLA to a single issue: "whether . . . the value of the land exchanged for 
Section 16 is adequate under its trust obligations." Order at 11, R. 526. On that ground, 
the Board concluded that the agency was "not authorized to undertake a full-fledged 
review of other issues that NPCA might seek to raise," particularly since the Court had 
denied NPCA any right to intervene in "executive decisions" to convey land. Order at 12, 
R. 527. 
7
 In 2000 the statutes construed in the cited cases to incorporate the adequate 
consideration requirement (U.C.A. sections 17-4-3 and 17-5-48) were renumbered with 
modifications of the latter not pertinent to that court-imposed restriction. See renumbered 
sections 17-50-302 and 17-50-312. 
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There is no basis for the Board's narrow reading of the remand order in NPCA-I. It 
is true that the order focused on the need to obtain an appraisal independently of Garfield 
County, for the obvious reason that the County's sponsorship of the first appraisal 
rendered it invalid. But nothing in the Court's order suggested that SITLA must ignore 
other illegal aspects of the exchange transaction revealed by a subsequent appraisal. To 
the contrary, the very purpose of an independent appraisal is to ensure a lawful exchange 
of values. Moreover, the opinion in NPCA-I was explicit on the point, saying: "Clearly, 
trustees have a duty to act according to applicable law." 869 P.2d at 921. 
Moreover, the Board's reasoning wholly disregarded the actual content of NPCA's 
claims on administrative appeal and the context in which they were made. NPCA's claims 
sought only SITLA consideration of substantive criticisms of the completed appraisal 
report and transaction. No direct participation in SITLA's proceedings was sought. NPCA 
urged only that its criticisms be accepted as a basis for further steps by SITLA to 
restructure any disposition of Park Section 16 in a manner that could facilitate acquisition, 
at fair value, by an entity committed to protection of its noneconomic values. 
Finally, contrary to SITLA Board's argument that it lacked jurisdiction to invalidate 
the deeds previously exchanged, Order at 12-13, 527-28, NPCA did not seek that result 
from the Board. Rather, NPCA contended that the Board had ample authority to take 
interim steps toward preserving the status quo pending further remedies for the unlawful 
transaction, and deferring ultimate completion of the transaction. The Board's Order did 
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not explain why SITLA, recognizing the illegality of the transaction, could not exercise its 
broad authority and duty to "ensure that the administration is managed according to law," 
U.C.A. § 53C-1-204(2), by taking interim steps pending further action to address the 
illegality. None of the interim steps suggested by NPCA8 were considered, nor was their 
rejection explained. 
IV, NEITHER THE "CLAIM PRECLUSION" NOR THE "ISSUE 
PRECLUSION" BRANCHES OF THE RES JUDICATA DOCTRINE 
FORECLOSE NPCA'S CHALLENGE TO THE UNLAWFUL 
CONSIDERATION TO GARFIELD COUNTY DISCLOSED BY THE 
McCONKIE APPRAISAL. 
The SITLA Board's Order argues that NPCA is barred by res judicata from raising 
the issue of inadequate consideration to Garfield County, apparently relying on the belief 
that NPCA should have asserted that claim on the basis of values recited in the original 
invalid appraisal. Order at 12, R. 527. Yet the very point ofNPCA-I was that the original 
appraisal had no authority. Nor could NPCA have anticipated the vastly greater disparity 
disclosed by the McConkie appraisal. 
8
 NPCA suggested that, among other possible steps, the SILA Board could stay the 
effectiveness of SITLA's approval of the appraisal; or give notice to avoid actions or 
dispositions affecting the exchanged lands; or request mutual rescission of the deeds 
pending possible renegotiation; or initiate proceedings to reform the deeds to provide for 
disposition of alternative properties; or itself initiate legal action seeking appropriate 
mandatory or declaratory remedies; or in anticipation of legal action request an opinion of 
the Attorney General regarding legality of the transaction and appropriate remedies. 
Appellant's Response to Proposed Order at 11, R. 456. 
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Recent Utah Supreme Court precedent is very clear that "a plaintiff need only 
include claims in a suit for res judicata purposes if the plaintiff was aware of the facts 
upon which the later claims were based at the time the first suit was filed." Macris & 
Associates. Inc. v. Newavs. Inc., 2000 UT 23, ^ [24, 16 P.3d 1214, at 1220 (Utah 2000). 
Since the only appraisal previously available as the basis for assessing possible illegality 
of consideration was held invalid ab initio, and the disputed appraisal did not exist when 
NPCA-I was litigated, there was no way for NPCA then to have ascertained the unlawful 
disparity or presented that claim. In addition, except for NPCA's participation as a party 
in both cases, the disparity claim meets none of the conditions for collateral estoppel 
required by Macris & Associates, Inc., supra. Specifically, the claim was neither 
challenged, nor is it identical with, the claims in NPCA-L nor was it in any manner 
litigated; and the issue was neither address nor decided in the prior case. Moreover, even 
identity of parties is not fully satisfied because appellant William Wolverton, a Garfield 
County taxpayer with standing to complain about inadequate consideration to the County, 
was not a party in the 1993 case. In short, neither branch of the res judicata doctrine 
applies. 
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V. IN ADDRESSING THE APPRAISAL ERRORS AND UNLAWFUL 
CONSIDERATION, SITLA SHOULD SUSPEND ITS APPROVAL OF THE 
McCONKIE APPRAISAL, INITIATE PROCEEDINGS TO INVALIDATE 
THE PREVIOUSLY-EXCHANGED DEEDS, AND GIVE FULL 
CONSIDERATION TO THE FEASIBILITY OF STRUCTURING AN 
ALTERNATIVE DISPOSITION, AT FAIR VALUE, TO AN ENTITY 
COMMITTED TO PROTECTING THE NONECONOMIC "UNIQUE 
SCENIC, PALEONTOLOGICAL, AND ARCHEOLOGICAL VALUES" OF 
PARK SECTION 16 IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS COURT'S 
GUIDANCE IN NPC A-L 
Because Exchange 188 has not yet been validated by an adequate appraisal, and 
fails for inadequate consideration to the County, the SITLA Board should exercise its 
discretion and authority to reconsider the exchange and initiate consideration of an 
alternative disposition for Section 16, giving weight to the following highly relevant 
factors: 
(1) its authority to suspend its approval of the McConkie appraisal while 
pursuing remedies to reverse the previous exchange of deeds; and 
(2) the concerns emphasized by the Court in NPCA v. Board of State Lands 
regarding alternative dispositions that will protect trust lands having important 
noneconomic values, giving full consideration to the statutory preservation and protection 
goals for national park lands, specifically including Sec. 16; and 
(3) the feasibility of structuring a new transaction for disposition of Park 
Section 16, with fair value to the school trust, for conveyance of the section to an entity 
committed to providing such protection. 
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Although NPCA has not contested the SITLA Board's continuance of its appeal 
from SITLA's denial of its Rulemaking proposal, which sought a rule to similar effect, it 
explicitly reserved its claim that — 
a proper lower valuation of Section 16, if established in further appraisal 
proceedings, should be considered by the Board as the basis for an alternative 
exchange or purchase on conditions that will protect the natural and aesthetic 
values of the section while returning fair value to the trust. 
Appellant's Response to Proposed Order at 14-15, R. 459-60. 
The SITLA Board has simply declined to provide any analysis or explanation for 
refusing to consider such an alternative disposition, except to reject NPCA's substantive 
challenges and misconstrue NPCA's appeal as a reassertion of its rejected claim in 
NPCA-I that "priority" must be given to protection. Order at 18, R. 533. To the contrary, 
NPCA's claims recognize that the Board has a substantial range of discretion in 
structuring dispositions of trust lands. But because Exchange 188 continues to fail both 
appraisal and legal standards, NPCA urges that the agency has obligations both to meet 
legal requirements, and to offer rational grounds for declining even to consider an 
alternative transaction that would return fair value to the trust while also meeting the 
concerns for protection of noneconomic values so forcefully expressed in NPCA-I. 
CONCLUSION 
In dismissing NPCA's administrative appeal, the SITLA Board failed to address the 
merits of every factual and legal contention presented. It failed to address or explain -
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* how an appraisal purporting to rely on a values attributed to development of an 
entire section of land could be adequate where it fails even to consider the dominant 
topographic, economic and regulatory limitations on development; 
* how an appraisal that withholds from the public most data and analysis, as well as 
the terms or conditions on which the appraisal is provided, can fulfill the basic purpose of 
public accountability; 
* what limitations on agency authority and discretion bar it from taking 
administrative steps, short of adjudication of deeds, to avert a transaction that is admitted 
to involve a clearly unlawful disposition of property by a local government entity; and 
* what limitations on agency authority and discretion bar it from taking 
administrative steps to reject or reconsider a land exchange with all these deficiencies and 
consider an alternative disposition, with fair value to the school trust, that can better 
ensure protection of important noneconoinic values on trust property. 
NPCA acknowledges that NPCA-I expressions of concern about protection of 
noneconoinic values on trust lands were technically "dictum." But NPCA's emphasis in its 
administrative appeal has been upon the duty to give reasonable consideration to those 
concerns in the context of making a decision about disposition of such lands - where the 
continuing inadequacies of Exchange 188 offer occasion for that reconsideration. 
Although the Court's discussion of these concerns was "dictum" in a formal sense, it 
authoritatively identified important factors highly relevant to such dispositions. SITLA 
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does bear a duty of reasoned decision that adequately considers and explains the agency's 
disposition of well-supported claims. Committee of Consumer Services v. Public Service 
Commission of Utah, 2003 UT 29, f 13, 75 P.3d 481, 485-86 (agency provided "neither an 
adequate nor a fair and rational basis" for dispensing with required analysis); Gibson v. 
Department of Employment Sec. 840 P.2d 780 (Utah App.,1992)(Board failed to discuss 
consideration or weight given to relevant factors). That duty surely requires explained 
consideration of factors which the Supreme Court itself identified as important in 
disposition of lands having significant noneconomic values. In dismissing NPCA's appeal, 
the SITLA Board gave these factors no apparent consideration. It is NPCA's contention 
that this failure was arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion, requiring remand to 
the SITLA Board for a lawful decision. 
Respectfully submitted this ^  . day of February, 2008. 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
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ADDENDUM 
1 
THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES 
OF THE SCHOOL AND INSTITUTIONAL TRUST LANDS ADMINISTRATION 
In the Consolidated Matter of: 
Appeal from Final Agency Action 
Requested by 
National Parks Conservation Association 
and William Wolverton 
ORDER: (1) SEPARATING 
ADJUDICATIVE PROCEEDINGS; (2) 
GRANTING STATE'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS APPEAL- OF AGENCY 
ACTION RE EXCHANGE NO. 188; AND 
(3) CONTINUING CONSIDERATION OF 
REQUEST FOR RULEMAKING 
This Order is adopted by the School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration3 
Board of Trustees in the above-entitled formal adrninistrative adjudication.. 
INTRODUCTION 
This adjudicative proceeding involves an appeal by the National Parks and 
Conservation Association ("NPCA") and NPCA member William Wolverton 
(collectively "Petitioners") of final decisions by the Director of the School and 
Institutional Trust Lands Administration ("SITLA") to: (1) approve the valuation of state 
trust lands and non-trust lands involved in State Exchange 188 on remand from the Utah 
Supreme Court in the case of National Parlzs and Conservation Association v. Board of 
State Lands, 869 P. 2d 909 (Utah 1993); and (2) deny NPCA's Petition for a Rule Change 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-12. 
The Board of Trustees for SITLA (the "Board") has jurisdiction to hear 
Petitioners5 appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 5301-304(2). On October 19, 2006, the 
Board conducted an initial hearing in this adjudication pursuant to Utah Administrative 
Code R850~8-100Q(6), and determined that it would conduct the adjudication of the 
appeals as a formal adjudicative proceeding pursuant to Utah Administrative Code R850-
8-1300. The Board appointed Board member James Leee as hearing examiner to 
conduct all proceedings hi the adjudications, pursuant to Utah Administrative Code 
R850-8-1500(2). On November 10,2006, SITLA moved to dismiss Petitioners' appeal 
both as to State Exchange 188 and as to the denial of the Petition of a Rule Change, for 
failure to state a cause of action. On December 13,2006, the hearing examiner granted 
Garfield County limited intervenor status solely for purposes of contesting 
NPCAAVolverton's appeal of SITLA's decision in the Exchange No. 188 matter. After 
briefing by the parties, the hearing examiner heard oral arguments on March 14, 2007. 
The hearing examiner submitted a proposed order in this proceeding for consideration by 
the Board, which order is now adopted by the Board 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Utah Code Ann. § 53C-1-304 authorizes the Board to adjudicate appeals from 
final actions by the Director of SITLA. The Board is required to uphold the final action 
of the Dh-ector unless it finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency action 
violated applicable law, rules, or Board policy. This matter is before the Board on 
SITLA's Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, pursuant to U.R.C.P. 
12(b)(6). In reviewing a Motion to Dismiss, the Board must construe the pleadings in the 
light most favorable to the Petitioners, and indulge all reasonable inferences in their 
favor. Mounteerv. Utah Power & Light, 823 P. 2d 1055 (Utah 1991). Where, as here, 
the parlies have chosen to submit materials outside the pleadings, the Board may treat the 
pending Motion to Dismiss as a Motion for Summary Judgment under U.R.C.P. 56. 
UJR..C.P. 12(c). The Board must consider only facts that are not in dispute, Sorenson v. 
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Beers, 585 P.2d 458 (Utah 1978), and may rule in favor of the movant only if it appears 
as a matter of law that the Petitioners cannot prevail. Harvey v. Sanders, 534 P.2d 905 
(Utah 1975). 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Board finds that the following facts are undisputed, based upon the materials 
submitted by the parties or officially noted by the Board: 
State Exchange No, 188 
1. This adjudication arises from a 1987 land exchange between the State of Utah, 
acting through the Division of State Lands & Forestry (the "Division") and Garfield 
County. The facts of that exchange are set forth in the opinion of the Supreme Court in 
National Parks and Conservation Association v. Board of State Lands, 869 P. 2d 909 
(Utah 1993) (the "NPCA decision"), and are incorporated by reference in this Order. 
2. The land that is the subject of this dispute is a 640 acre section of former state 
school trust land that is located within the boundaries of Capitol Reef National Park in 
Garfield County, and is legally described as section 16, Township 34 South, Range 8 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian (the "Subject Property" or "Section 16"). The Subject 
Property is traversed by a county road known as the Burr Trail, which has been the 
subject of substantial environmental controversy. NPCA, 869 P.2d at 911. 
3. In 1987, Garfield County sought to acquire the Subject Property from the State in 
exchange for several parcels of land owned by the County elsewhere in the County, and 
in the Richfield City Industrial Park. Id; SITLA Statement of Facts % 1; Petitioners' 
Statement of Facts f L 
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4. NPCA sought to intervene in the land exchange proceedings by petition to the 
Division dated October 14,1987. This petition was denied by the Division on November 
16,1987. NPCA, 869 P.2d at 912. 
5. NPCA also filed requests for declaratory rulings from the Division with respect to 
the proposed land exchange under a now-repealed statute requiring administrative 
agencies to hear petitions for declaratory rulings, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-15 (repealed 
effective April 25,1988). On December 21, 1987, the Division denied certain of 
NPCA's requests, and refused to respond to others. Id 
6. On December 24, 1987, the Governor consummated the land exchange by 
executing a patent conveying the Subject Property to Garfield County. Id. 
7. NPCA subsequently filed a writ of review with the Utah Supreme Court 
challenging the Division's actions in approving the exchange, and the Division's denial 
of its petitions for declaratory rulings. Id. 
The Supreme Court Litigation 
8. In its June 24,1993 opinion, the Utah Supreme Court determined that NPCA had 
standing to challenge the Division's actions with respect to the exchange. 869 P.2d at 
913-4. The Court then denied NPCA's petition to intervene in the land exchange 
transaction, on the basis that there was no statutory authorization for third-party 
intervention in the state's determination to dispose of real property. Id. at 914-5. 
9. The Supreme Court then addressed NPCA's requests for declaratory rulings, 
which had been denied or not considered by the Division. The Court upheld the 
Division's determinations with respect to the scope and nature of its trust responsibilities 
concerning school trust lands. However, the Court determined that the Division had 
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improperly relied on land appraisals submitted by Garfield County for the lands to be 
exchanged, rather than commissioning its own independent appraisals. The Court found 
that the Division's fiduciary responsibilities to the school trust required it to obtain 
independent appraisals of trust assets before conveying such lands, and that failure to do 
so breached the Division's trust duties. 869 P.2d at 922. 
10. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Division for a determination of 
whether the appraised values of the Subject Property and the lands offered by Garfield 
County represented the full value of those lands. 869 P.2d at 923. 
The Current Valuation Dispute 
11. The Supreme Court denied rehearing in the case on March 26, l/?94. On July 1, 
1994, the Division of State Lands & Forestry went out of existence, the legislature having 
transferred responsibility for management of the state's school and institutional trust 
lands to the newly-created School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration pursuant 
to the Utah School and Institutional Trust Lands Management Act, Utah Code Ann, §§ 
53C-1-101 et seq. 
12. After receiving a third-party request to purchase certain of the exchange lands, 
SITLA determined that the Division had not completed the review of appraised values 
directed by the Supreme Court prior to going out of existence. In order to comply with 
the Supreme Court's direction, SITLA retained an independent appraisal firm, Morley & 
McConkie, L.C, to review valuation of the lands. SITLA Statement of Facts % 16. 
13. On August 25,2005, Stanford S. McConkie, MAI of Morley & McConkie, L.C. 
submitted a review of valuation of the exchange lands entitled "Limited Restricted Use 
Report Appraisal of Three Parcels of Land Located in Garfield County and Two 
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Industrial Lots Located in Richfield Sevier County Utah" (the "McConkie Appraisal"). 
SITLA Memorandum, Exhibit B. 
14. The McConkie Appraisal concluded that Section 16 was currently worth 
$200,000, while the County exchange lands were currently worth 3661,200. SITLA 
Statement of Facts, Tf 17. Petitioners dispute the adequacy and accuracy of the McConkie 
Appraisal. Petitioners Statement of Facts, fflf 16-17. 
15. On August 29, 2006, NPCA submitted to SITLA a review of the McConkie 
Appraisal prepared by J. Philip Cook, MAI and Virginia H. Hylton, Appraiser (the "Cook 
Appraisal Review") which evaluated the McConkie Appraisal's compliance with the 
Appraisal Foundation's Uniform Standards for Professional Appraisal Practice 
("USPAP") and with the Appraisal Institute's Code of Professional Ethics and Standards 
of Professional Appraisal Practice. SITLA Statement of Facts, 119; SITLA 
Memorandum, Exhibit D. 
16. The Cook Appraisal Review found that the McConkie Appraisal complied with 
USPAP standards for a Restricted Use Appraisal Report. The Cook Appraisal Review 
disagreed with Mr. McConkie's determination of the highest and best use of Section 16, 
and of the estimated time to market utilized by Mr. McConkie. The Cook Review 
concluded that the highest and best use of Section 16 was as a secluded single user 
vacation retreat, rather than 40 acre lots as concluded by Mr. McConkie, and that this 
would result in a higher present value than concluded by Mr. McConkie. Cook Appraisal 
Review at 4. 
17. On September 25,2006, SITLA's Director took formal action and determined 
that, based upon the McConkie Appraisal and SITLA's staff review and concurrence, that ^  
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the school trust had obtained full value in the exchange, for purposes of comphance with 
the Supreme Court's remand in the NPCA litigation. SITLA Statement of Facts, f 25; 
SITLA Memorandum, Exhibit H. 
18. Petitioners timely filed their appeal of the Director's decision to approve the 
exchange valuations on September 29, 2006 in accordance with Utah Code Ann, § 53C-
1-304(2) and Utah Administrative Code R850-8-1000 (2006). 
The Rulemaking Appeal 
19. On September 29,2006, NPCA submitted a Petition for Rulemaking to SITLA 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-12 and Utah Adminisfrative Code R. 15-2 (2006). 
20. The NPCA Petition for Rulemaking was based upon the following language in the 
Supreme Court's opinion in NPCA: 
We turn now to an issue that is of great importance to this state. Located 
on some state school lands are unique scenic, archaeological, and 
paleontological sites. Such treasures are legacies of past millennia whose 
value could never be expressed in monetary terms. The question is, can 
such treasures be preserved without violating the terms of the school trust? 
We think so.... 
The Division should recognize that some school lands have unique scenic, 
paleontological, and archaeological values that would have little economic 
value on the open market. In some cases, it would be unconscionable not 
to preserve and protect those values. It may be possible for the Division to 
protect and preserve those values without dimmishing the economic value 
of the land. For example, with appropriate restrictions it may be possible 
for livestock grazing and perhaps even mineral extraction to occur on a 
school section without damaging archaeological and paleontological sites. 
But when economic exploitation of such lands is not compatible with the 
noneconomic values, the state may have to consider exchanging T>nblic 
trust lands or other state lands for school lands. Indeed, it might be 
necessary for the state to buy or lease the school lands from the trust so 
that unique noneconomic values can be preserved and protected and the 
full economic value of the school trust lands still realized. 
NPCA Petition for Rulemaking, f 3, citing NPCA, 869 P. 2d at 920-1 (emphasis added by 
NPCA). 
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21. NPCA's Petition for Rulemaking requests that SITLA enact a rule that would: (1) 
require SITLA to take all feasible action to protect trust lands with "unique scenic, 
archaeological, and paleontological sites" or other noneconomic values and provide for 
disposition alternatives that will protect those values while realizing fair economic value 
to the school trust, including at a minimum all trust lands within National and State 
Parks, National Monuments, National Wildlife Refuges, and river corridors nominated 
for Wild and Scenic River status; (2) require SITLA, in consultation with the Grovemor, 
to take all feasible steps to have the state or federal government acquire the lands for 
protection by purchase or exchange, at fair appraised value; and (3) when appraising 
lands for conservation transactions, take into account all values accruing to the State of 
Utah or the public schools generally accruing from recreation, tourism and educational 
values of protecting the lands, and ecosystem services attributable to retention and 
preservation of the land NPCA Petition, ff 1, 2, 4, 5. 
22. On October 5,2006, SITLA denied NPCA's request for rulemaking. SITLA 
Statement of Facts, fl 29; SITLA Memorandum, Exhibit K. NPCA timely appealed the 
denial by letter dated October 18,2006. 
23. On October 19, 2006, the Board conducted an initial hearing in both 
adjudications pursuant to Utah Administrative Code R850-8-1000(6), and determined 
that it would conduct the adjudication of the two appeals on a consolidated basis as a 
formal adjudicative proceeding pursuant to Utah Administrative Code R850-84300. 
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DISCUSSION 
I. Introduction 
The Board has carefully considered the opinion of the Supreme Court in the 
original NPCA litigation. The Supreme Court addressed multiple issues raised by NPCA 
with respect to the disputed land exchange, and finally adjudicated all but one: whether 
the value of the exchange lands conveyed by Garfield County represented fair value to 
the school trust 869 P. 2d at 922-3. The Court remanded this and only this issue to the 
Division of State Lands & Forestry. 
Aiter the Division failed to address the remand before it went out of existence, 
SITLA staff subsequently discovered the lapse, and, as the current management agency 
for school trust lands, undertook the valuation review. This valuation review was based 
upon an independent appraisal commissioned by the agency, as specifically directed by 
the Supreme Court. The appraisal determined that, in the interval since the land 
exchange, the lands conveyed by Garfield County to the school trust, located near the 
Bryce Canyon airport and in the Richfield City industrial park, had increased in value 
proportionately more than the former Section 16, located inside Capitol Reef National 
Park. The appraiser concluded that the county lands now owned by the school trust were 
approximately 330% of the value of former Section 16, as opposed to a 150% ratio at the 
time of the exchange. Based upon this favorable valuation ratio, the Director of SITLA 
concluded that the exchange remained favorable to the school trust. The Director 
incorporated these conclusions in a formal finding dated September 15, 2006, in order to 
finally address the Supreme Court's direction on remand from the NPCA opinion. 
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The Petitioners appealed the Director's September 15, 2006 finding to the Board 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 53C-l-304(2) and Utah Administrative CbcfeR850-8-1000 
(2006). Petitioners argue that: 
(1) the valuation ratio revealed by the McConkie Appraisal, which 
determined that the county lands conveyed to the school trust were now 
substantially more valuable than Section 16, revealed that the County had 
violated applicable law requiring the County to receive fair value for 
conveying county lands. NPCA Appeal, f 111(1), (2), at 5-6. 
(2) the McConkie Appraisal, because it was a "Restricted Use Report", i.e. 
a summary valuation report rather than a full narrative appraisal, did not 
satisfy the Supreme Court's requirement of an independent appraisal. 
NPCA Appeal, fIH(3), at 6. 
(3) the McConkie appraisal contains various flaws in its evaluation of 
terrain, presence of water and utilities, and legal constraints associated 
with the parcel's location within the exterior boundaries of Capitol Reef 
National Park. NPCA Appeal, f m(3)(b)-(d), at 7. 
(4) in reviewing valuation of tihe exchange lands, SITLA should have 
considered the NPCA Court's direction that the State of Utah, when faced 
with the conflict between economic development and protection of certain 
school trust lands with unique scenic, paleontologicaL, and archaeological 
values, may need to ensure protection of those values (in this case by 
voiding the Garfield County exchange and pursuing an alternative 
negotiated conservation transaction). NPCA Appeal, f m(4), at 9-10. 
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The Board will address each of the Petitioners' contentions in turn. 
DL Alleged Inadequate Consideration for County Lands. 
The McConlcie Appraisal found that the lands that the school trust obtained from 
Garfield County in the 1989 exchange had increased in value proportionately more than 
Section 16. At the time of the original exchange, the county lands were valued at 
$98,500, while Section 16 was valued at $65,000, a valuation ratio of 151.5 per cent in 
favor of the school trust. The McConkie appraisal found that by 2005, the value of the 
former county lands had increased to $661,200, while Section 16 had increased in value 
to $200,000, resulting in an increased a valuation ratio of 330.5%. 
NPCA argues that the Board should void the exchange between Garfield County 
and the Division because Utah law required the County to obtain adequate compensation 
in exchange for the county lands, and the 330.5% current valuation ratio indicates that the 
County did not receive adequate compensation. NPCA Appeal at 5-6. NPCA is correct 
that as a general matter, local governments may not dispose of real property without 
adequate compensation. Municipal Building Authority of Iron County v. Lowder, 111 
P.2d 273,282-3 (Utah 1985); Sears v. Ogden City, 533 P.2d 118,119 (Utah 1975). 
However, the Board finds that it does not have jurisdiction to set aside the exchange on 
the basis of the County receiving inadequate compensation, because such a determination 
would be both beyond the scope of the Supreme Court's remand, and beyond the Board's 
statutory powers in any event. 
The Supreme Court's remand of Hie original NPCA case to the Division was 
limited and specific; the Division was to determine whether ".. .the value of the land 
exchanged for section 16 is adequate under its trust obligations." 869 P.2d at 923. The 
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Division (and its successor SITLA) was not autliorized to undertake a Ml-fledged review 
of other issues that NPCA might seek to raise at that time; in fact, the Supreme Court 
specifically held that NPCA was not entitled to intervene at the agency level to challenge 
the Division's executive detennination to convey lands, since to allow private entities to 
force adjudication of any of the myriad realty transactions undertaken by the state could 
paralyze the state's ability to acquire and dispose of property. 869 P.2d at 914, citing 
Terracor v. Utah Bd. of State Lands, 716 P.2d 796 (Utah 1986). The Supreme Court 
stated that the appropriate method of challenging a purportedly illegal conveyance would 
be through an action for injunctive relief in the District Court, where a factual record 
could be developed and the legality of the agency action tested against governing law. Id. 
NPCA would have SITLA, and this Board, unilaterally determine that Garfield 
County acted illegally when it conveyed the lands to the State of Utah because the 
County allegedly did not receive adequate compensation. This determination would be 
well beyond the scope of the Supreme Court's specific remand, which was limited to 
determination of the adequacy of compensation to the school trust The Board also points 
out that the imbalance between the value of lands granted by the county and section 16 
was expressly noted by the Supreme Court. 869 P.2d at 912. NPCA could have raised 
this issue at that time, either before the Supreme Court or in an independent action. By 
failing to raise the imbalance issue at that time, NPCA is now barred by the doctrine of 
res judicata from raising the issue now. Penrodv. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P. 2d 
873, 875 (Utah 1983).. 
NPCA's contentions would also require the Board to act beyond its jurisdiction. 
In its statutory capacity as an adjudicative body, the SITLA Board's jurisdiction is 
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limited to the powers expressly granted to it by the Utah legislature. High Country 
Estates Homeowners Ass 'n v. Bagley & Company, 901 P.2d 1017 (Utah 1995), on 
remand 928 P.2d 1047, cert. den. 937 P.2d 137; Bevans v. Industrial Cornm 'n of Utah, 
790 P.2d 573, 576 (Utah App. 1990). Here, the legislature has not given this Board the 
authority to adjudicate whether Garfield County exceeded its powers by conveying lands 
for purportedly inadequate consideration. Title to Section 16 has been in Garfield County 
for almost 20 years. Neither SITLA not the Board has any legislatively-granted power to 
unilaterally adjudicate that a prior conveyance by the State was invalid because of the 
grantee's lack of authority.That is the role of the courts, a role that this Board will not 
usurp. 
HI. Adequacy of the McConkie Appraisal. 
A. Legal Adequacy of a Restricted Use Appraisal, 
NPCA next argues that SITLA's use of a restricted appraisal report, instead of a 
full narrative appraisal, did not satisfy the Supreme Court's directive on remand that the 
Division determine whether value of the land exchanged for Section 16 represented full 
and adequate value for the school trust The report relied upon by SITLA was prepared 
by Stanford S. McConkie, MAI and was entitled "Limited Restricted Use Report: 
Appraisal of Three Parcels of Land Located in Garfield County and Two Industrial Lots 
Located in Richfield Sevier County Utah." Counsel for SITLA stated at oral argument 
that a restricted appraisal, rather than a full narrative appraisal, was deemed adequate by 
SITLA for the agency's internal review of the valuation of the exchange parcels, and was 
less expensive than a narrative appraisal. Transcript at 28-29. The McConkie Appraisal 
states that it was intended as a Restricted Use Appraisal Report set forth under Standards 
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Rule 2-2(c) of the Uniform Standards for Professional Appraisal Practice ("USPAP"), 
and was the result of a limited appraisal process that departed in some respects from 
specific USPAP guidelines, which could impact the reliability of the value conclusions 
provided. McConkie Appraisal at 2. 
NPCA obtained a review of the McConkie Appraisal from J. Philip Cook, MAI, 
which was dated July 25,2006. Hie Cook Review stated that the McConkie Appraisal 
was compliant m form with USPAP and with the Appraisal Institute's Code of 
Professional Ethics and Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice. Cook Review at 4. 
However, Mr. Cook noted that he disagreed with the McConkie report's assumption that 
the highest and best use of Section 16 could be obtained by subdividing the property into 
40 acre lots. Mr. Cook concluded that the highest and best use of Section 16 was to 
market the property as a single large parcel to an out-of-state investor for exclusive 
vacation use. A corollary of this conclusion was that Mr. Cook felt that Mr. McConkie 
had overestimated the marketing time for the property, which would be less for a single 
sale than for multiple lots. In its briefing, NPCA also argued that the McConkie appraisal 
had failed to consider the location of Section 16 inside Capitol Reef National Park, which 
NPCA alleged would preclude any use inconsistent with park purposes, depressing the 
value of the parcel. NPCA Opposition at 7-10. 
NPCA's arguments require the Board to answer two questions about the 
McConkie appraisal. First, based upon the facts alleged by NPCA, was SITLA's use of a 
restricted use appraisal sufficient as a matter of law to meet the Supreme Court's mandate 
on remand? If so, what is the legal effect of the alleged factual errors in the McConkie 
appraisal? 
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The Board concludes that SITLA's use of a restricted use appraisal was sufficient 
to meet the Supreme Court's mandate. The Supreme Court specifically directed the 
Division to determine independently (i.e. without reliance on Garfield County's 
appraisals) whether full compensation had been achieved by the school trust. In 
USPAP's discussions of allowable types of appraisals, the Appraisal Foundation 
specifically states: "When the intended users do not include parties other than the client, a 
Restricted Use Appraisal Report may be provided." USPAP Standards Rule 2-2, 
Comment, available at http://commerce.appraisal foundation.org. USPAP Standard 2-
2(c) sets specific standards for this type of appraisal. Id, Although Mr. Cook disagreed 
with factual conclusions drawn by Mr. McConkie as to highest and best use, he stated 
that the McConkie appraisal was compliant with all requirements of USPAP for such an 
appraisal. Because the directive of the Supreme Court iiiNPCA was for the Division to 
determine for the benefit of the school trust whether value had been achieved, a restricted 
use appraisal (as defined and controlled by USPAP Standard 2, as was the case with the 
McConkie appraisal), was legally sufficient. The Supreme Court's directive was for an 
independent review of valuation, which was accomplished. 
B. Technical Disputes with the McConkie Appraisal; Standing. 
NPCA asserts that the McConkie Appraisal incorrectly assessed the terrain and 
utility access situation for Section 16, and disregarded the impact of the parcel's location 
inside Capitol Reef National Park on the parcels' value. The Board must assume for the 
purposes of the pending motion that NPCA's assertions are correct. That said, the Board 
is free to note that NPCA's factual contentions on valuation issues are so contradictory as 
to be impossible to reconcile. NPCA's principal argument, discussed above, is that the 
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exchange was illegal because the school trust received too muctu with Garfield County 
receiving allegedly inadequate consideration. NPCA's review appraiser, Mr. Cook 
criticizes the McConkie Appraisal for using exposure times and a highest and best use 
that would lead to a reduced value conclusion, in contrast to Mr. Cook's conclusion that 
the section would have substantial value as a private retreat NPCA then devotes 
substantial argument to the exact opposite proposition — that Section 16 is not worth 
much of anything, both because it is located within Capitol Reef National Park, and 
purportedly subject to National Park Service regulations that would preclude economic 
use, and because of adverse terrain and utility access. Transcript at 17-19. 
The Board need not resolve these inconsistencies, hi NPCA,, the Supreme Court 
specifically denied NPCA the right to intervene in the exchange transaction. The Court 
articulated the sound policy for denying third party intervention into executive real 
property decisions: 
The reason for allowing the state to deal with leasing, selling, and 
exchanging property as an executive decision is not difficult to ascertain. 
The state, through its various agencies, engages in innumerable 
transactions for the purchase, sale, exchange, and lease of real and 
personal property. If these transactions were subject to the delay inherent 
in adjudicative proceedings at the demand of a third party asserting a 
private interest, government programs dealing with the acquisition and 
disposition of property could be paralyzed. See Terracor v. Utah Bd. Of 
State Lands, 716 P. 2d 796 (Utah 1986). 
869 P. 2d at 914. In the Terracor case cited by the NPCA court, the Utah Supreme Court 
held that, in dispositions of school trust properties, the school trust beneficiaries are the 
most appropriate party to challenge a conveyance of trust lands, and that third parties 
would not have standing to do so. See also Forest Guardians v. Powell, 24 P.3d 803 
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(N.M. App. 2001)(conservation groups lack standing to assert the interests of trust 
beneficiaries in challenge to school trust actions). 
In the original NPCA litigation, the Supreme Court granted NPCA standing to 
raise a policy issue: the overall scope and nature of the state's school trust obligation. 
At the same time, it declined on policy grounds to allow NPCA to intervene in the State's 
executive decisionmaking concerning the conveyance of lands. The Board finds that, on 
remand, the Petitioners do not have standing to attack SITLA's substantive internal 
decisionmaking concerning the specific values of the lands committed to a state land 
exchange. Indeed, the contradictory quilt of valuation assertions made by NPCA 
illustrates the Supreme Court's wisdom in insulating executive real estate decisions from 
the adjudicative process. If third parties could take issue with multiple aspects of the 
value of trust lands in every trust lands exchange or sale, the school trust would, as the 
Supreme Court warned, risk paralysis in fulfilling its statutory purpose. The purpose of 
the Supreme Court's remand was for the Division/SITLA to obtain an independent 
valuation of the exchange lands and determine adequacy for purposes of the state's trust 
beneficiaries. That direction has unquestionably been fulfilled. 
IV, Consideration of the Unique Attributes of Section 16 under NPCA. 
NPCA next argues that SITLA's approval of the exchange values on remand 
violated two duties enunciated by the Supreme Court in the NPCA opinion. First, NPCA 
claims that SITLA violated the Supreme Court's comment that: 
The Division should recognize that some school lands have unique scenic, 
paleontological, and archaeological values that would have little economic 
value on the open market. In some cases, it would be unconscionable not 
to preserve and protect those values.... [Wjhen economic exploitation of 
such lands is not compatible with the noneconomic values, the state may 
have to consider exchanging public trust lands or other state lands for 
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school lands. Indeed, it might be necessary for the state to buy or lease the 
school lands from the trust so that unique noneconornic values can be 
preserved and protected, and the full economic value of the school trust 
lands still realized. 869 P.2d at 921. 
Second, NPCA contends that SITLA violated the principle enunciated by Hie Court that 
trustees, including the State as trustee of Utah's school trust, have a duty to act in 
accordance with applicable law. NPCA argues that by allowing Garfield County to 
receive inadequate compensation, and by approving a transaction that NPCA believes 
does not comply with the Court's statement regarding protection of non-economic values, 
SITLA is violating applicable law. NPCA Appeal at 9-10. 
The Board believes that NPCA has completely misconstrued the obligation placed 
on SITLA by the NPCA opinion, as it relates to the case now before the Board.. The 
Supreme Court stated that "in some cases" the State may have the obligation to protect 
unique noneconornic values on trust lands by considering exchange or protective 
purchase of the lands. However, it found that the Division had in fact adequately 
considered aesthetic and recreational values in deciding to exchange Section 16. 869 
P.2d at 921. It further found that the Board of State Lands & Forestry had acted correctly 
in refusing to give priority to the scenic, aesthetic, and recreational values of section 16 
over economic values when it approved the exchange. Id. 
The Supreme Court has thus fully adjudicated the issues raised by NPCA here. 
The Supreme Court's determination is binding on NPCA, and on this Board, as res 
judicata. All are beyond the scope of the Supreme Court's remand to the Division. 
Indeed, the Board is mystified as to how NPCA believes that the Board could, twenty 
years after conveyance of Section 16 to Garfield County and thirteen years after the 
Supreme Court's ruling on these issues, somehow have the power to divest die County of 
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title to Section 16 and unwind the exchange in opposition to the Supreme Court's ruling 
to the contrary. NPCA's claims that SITLA violated the NPCA decision in this regard 
fail as a matter of law. 
V. Separation and Further Consideration of NPCA's Petition for Rulemaking 
Contemporaneously with its appeal of SITLA's decision to approve the land 
exchange values on remand from the Supreme Court, NPCA filed a petition for 
mlemaking with SITLA pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-12 and Utah 
Administrative Code R. 15-2 (2006). NPCA's Petition for Rulemaking was based on the 
language in the NPCA decision concerning the State's obligation in some cases to protect 
trust lands with "unique" noneconomic characteristics. NPCA requested that the 
proposed rule: (1) require SITLA to take all feasible action to protect trust lands with 
''unique scenic, archaeological, and paleontological sites" or other noneconomic values 
and provide for disposition alternatives that will protect those values while realizing fair 
economic value to the school trust, including at a minimum all trust lands within National 
and State Parks, National Monuments, National Wildlife Refiiges, and river corridors 
nominated for Wild and Scenic River status; (2) require SITLA, in consultation with the 
Governor, to take all feasible steps to have the state or federal government acquire the 
lands for protection by purchase or exchange, at fair appraised value; and (3) when 
appraising lands for conservation transactions, take into account all values accruing to the 
State of Utah or the public schools generally accruing from recreation, tourism and 
educational values of protecting the lands, and ecosystem services attributable to 
retention and preservation of the land. NPCA Petition, Iff 1, 2,4, 5. SITLA denied the 
Petition for Rulemaking on October 5,2006, and NPCA appealed. The Board 
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subsequently consolidated NPCA's appeal of SITLA's decision in the Supreme Court 
remand with the rulemaking appeal. 
The basis for SITLA's denial of the rulemaking petition was that the non-
economic values described in the NPCA decision could be protected without a rule that 
would limit SITLA's discretionary authority to manage trust lands in the most effective 
manner possible for the benefit of the trust beneficiaries. SITLA also noted the Board's 
decision in a prior adjudication to the effect that such a rule would unduly hamper the 
agency's ability to administer trust lands in a manner "most favorable to the 
beneficiaries" as required by Utah Code Ann. § 53C-l-302(b)(iv). 
The Board notes that many issues of concern to the conservation community 
concerning trust lands at the time of the NPCA decision have been resolved in accordance 
with the Supreme Court's directive that trust values and economic values be reconciled 
where possible. For example, all state trust lands located within National Parks, National 
Monuments, and National Recreation Areas have been exchanged to the United States. 
Similar land exchanges have removed or are proposed to remove trust lands from 
proposed wilderness areas, endangered species habitat, and scenic river corridors. State 
laws with respect to archaeological and paleontological resources on trust lands - of 
specific concern to the NPCA court - have been significantly strengthened. 
The Board is not convinced at this time that rulemaking - particularly as 
restrictive as that proposed by NPCA - is necessary or desirable to reconcile the interests 
of the trust beneficiaries and the interests of conservation. Nonetheless, in its 
policymaking capacity, the Board intends during the current fiscal year to study policy 
issues presented by the rulemaking petition and related issues with respect to public 
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interests in trust lands. SITLA's Motion to Dismiss NPCA's rulemaking petition will be 
taken under advisement pending such study. The Board reserves the right to request that 
Ihe parties submit additional briefing or argument during this period. 
Because the Board finds that the issues presented by Petitioners' appeal of the 
agency's approval of the land exchange valuation on remand are separate from the policy 
issue associated with the rulemaking petition, and because the exchange appeal may be 
resolved as a matter of law, the Board has determined that the two appeals should be 
separated. The Board's order with respect to the exchange valuation appeal will 
constitute a final order of the Board in that matter. The rulemaking appeal will be 
retained within the jurisdiction of the Board, and decided separately. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Board has jurisdiction to conduct these formal adjudicative proceedings 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 5301-304(2). 
2. In Petitioners' appeal of SITLA's approval of land exchange values for State 
Exchange No. 188 on remand from the Utah Supreme Court, the Board concludes: 
a. Petitioners' claims that SITLA's approval was wrongful because Garfield 
County received inadequate compensation are beyond the scope of the Supreme Court's 
remand and beyond the jurisdiction of the Board to determine. 
b. Petitioners' claims that the McConkie Appraisal, as a Restricted Use 
Appraisal, was legally inadequate to satisfy the Supreme Court's mandate on remand are 
incorrect. The Board concludes that a Restricted Use Appraisal that complies with the 
Appraisal Foundation's Uniform Standards for Professional Appraisal Practice with 
respect to such appraisals was legally sufficient to permit SITLA to ascertain that the 
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exchange values satisfied the State's trust responsibilities, as directed by the Supreme 
Court. 
c. Neither SITLA nor the Board are obligated as a matter of law to consider 
Petitioners' factual disputes with the McConkie appraisal with respect to issues such as 
highest and best use, utility access, restrictions on use imposed by the National Park 
Service, etc., because Petitioners lack standing to challenge specific valuation issues. 
d. Petitioners' claims that SITLA's approval of the exchange values on 
remand violated applicable law or the directives contained in the NPCA opinion are 
incorrect Petitioners' claims that the value approval should have considered the unique 
properties of Section 16 are barred by res judicata. 
3. Because Petitioners' have failed, based upon the undisputed facts, to state a claim 
that SITLA's approval of land exchange values for State Exchange No. 188 on remand 
from the Utah Supreme Court was unlawftil, Petitioner's appeal of such approval must be 
dismissed. 
ORDER 
1. Petitioners' appeal of SITLA's approval of land exchange values for State 
Exchange No. 188 on remand from the Utah Supreme Court is denied. 
2. NPCA's appeal of SITLA's denial of its September 18, 2006 Petition for 
Rulemaking is separated from Petitioners' appeal of land exchange values. The 
rulemaking appeal is retained under advisement by the Board, subject to further 
deliberation by the Board with respect to Board policy. 
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION OR JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 
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Any party affected by a final order or decision by the Board may file a petition for 
reconsideration and modification of an existing order within 20 days after the date the 
Order was issued by complying with Utah Admin Code R. 850-8-1700. 
Any party may request judicial review of this Order by complying with the 
requirements of Utah Admin. CodeR850-8-1300(3)(a) and (b), andR850~8-1900, which 
require a party seeking judicial review to: (1) file a petition for judicial review of a final 
order issued by the Board within 30 days after the date the order is issued or considered 
issued; (2) name the School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration and all other 
appropriate parties as respondents; and (3) file a petition for review of the Order with the 
appropriate court in the manner required by Utah Code Ann. §63-46-b-15 or §63-46b-16, 
as appropriate. IN THE EVENT A PETITION IS NOT FILED WITHIN THE 30 DAY 
TIME PERIOD, THIS ORDER WILL BECOME FINAL AND UNAPPEALABLE.. 
SO ORDERED BY THE BOARD THIS ]3_ W of September, 2007. 
. P. Morris, Chair 
VU 
J\ 
John $f. Ferry, Vi£e Chair 
1 1 
Gayle F. fcKeacbnie 
Michael Brown 
QMrtJt>d e &. 
James B. Lee 
/John R. Scales 
i/ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this h& day of September, 2007, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing FINAL ORDER: (1) SEPARATING ADJUDICATIVE PROCEEDINGS; 
AND (2) GRANTING STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL OF AGENCY 
ACTION RE EXCHANGE NO. 188 was sent to the following: 
TO: 
Wayne G. Petty 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
175 East 400 South, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Facsimile: 801-521-9015 
Email: wayne@moylelawfirm.com 
VIA: 
J± US Mail 
Facsimile 
Email 
Hand delivery 
William J. Lockhart 
5604 Pioneer Fork Road 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
Facsimile: 801-581-6897 
Email: lockhartb(a),law.utah.edu 
j US Mail 
Facsimile 
Email 
Hand delivery 
Thomas A. Mitchell 
Counsel for 
State of Utah, School & rnstitutional 
Trust Lands Administration 
675 East 500 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Facsimile: 801-355-0922 
Email: tommitchell@,utah. gov 
US Mail 
Facsimile 
Email 
NC Hand delivery 
Barry L. Huntington 
Garfield County Attorney 
55 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 388 
Panquitch,UT 84759 
Facsimile: 435-676-8239 
Email: garfieldcountvattomev@color-countrv.net 
_£ . US Mail 
Facsimile 
Email 
Hand delivery 
Ld. A^J/1ZL^>W •yU^-fk* 
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ADDENDUM 
2 
HARDIN A WHITNEY 
dm@moylelawfirm com 
O W O O D M O Y L E III 
wood@moylelawf»rm com 
WAYNE G. PETTY 
wayne@moylelawftrm com 
LAW OFFICES OF 
MOYLE & DRAPER 
A P R O F E S S I O N A L C O R P O R A T I O N 
C I T Y C E N T R E I S U I T E 900 
175 E A S T F O U R T H S O U T H 
S A L T L A K E C I T Y U T A H 84111 
T E L E P H O N E ( 8 0 1 ) 5 2 1 0250 
T E L E C O P I E R ( 8 0 1 ) 521 9015 
E M A I L moyle@moylelawfirm com 
Y O U N G & M O Y L E (1892 1934) 
M O Y L E & M O Y L E (1934 1971) 
OF COUNSEL 
J O S E P H J . PALMER 
josedem@aol com 
December 12, 2006 
Thomas A. Mitchell 
Senior Attorney 
School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration 
State of Utah 
675 East 500 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102-2818 
Re: Appeals Regarding Exchange 188 and Rule Making 
Request; 
Proposed Issues of Fact and Law 
Dear Tom: 
Please find enclosed NPCA's and Wolverton's statement 
of issues of fact and law. As you will see, there are various 
issues of fact for which we believe discovery is necessary or for 
which an evidentiary hearing may be required. For example the 
Morley & McConkie, L.C. "appraisal" is irreconcilably 
contradictory. (Regarding Section 16: "This parcel consists of 
land that is very irregular in terrain with steep sandstone 
cliffs and rocky terrain as well as some limited open space." 
Appraisal at p.3 "Parcel Three, located in the Capitol Reef 
National Park, has limited utility, if any." Appraisal, p. 6. 
The analysis then suggests selling Section 16 in 40-acre parcels, 
which would suggest 16 such parcels for the entire section. 
Appraisal, p 13. The appraisal does not reconcile the "limited 
open space," p.3, and the location of 16 40-acre parcels with the 
described development.) 
The Appraisal Review by Phillip Cook and Virginia 
Hylton, indicates some errors m the Morley & McConkie appraisal. 
We don't consider the appellants are limited in their analysis or 
criticism of the Morley & McConkie appraisal to comments in the 
Appraisal Review. We are considering witnesses who would testify 
regarding the character of the property, other appraisers or 
experts, and examination of Mr. McConkie. 
LAW OFFICES OF 
MOYLE & DRAPER 
A P R O F E S S I O N A L C O R P O R A T I O N 
Thomas A. Mitchell 
Senior Attorney 
Page Two 
December 12, 2006 
When you have had an opportunity to review the 
accompanying statement, please call so that we might arrange 
times to discuss a stipulated statement. 
Very truly yours, 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
Wayne G. Petty 
WGP\cb 
Enclosure 
cc: William J. Lockhart 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES 
SCHOOL AND INSTITUTIONAL TRUST LANDS ADMINISTRATION 
[SITLA] 
APPEAL FROM FINAL AGENCY ACTION 
BY THE SITLA DIRECTOR DATED 15 SEPTEMBER 2006 IN RE EXCHANGE 188 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ON BEFIALF OF THE NATIONAL PARKS 
CONSERVATION ASSOCIATION AND WILLIAM WOLVERTON REGARDING ISSUES 
OF FACT AND LAW TO BE DETERMINED IN THE ABOVE MATTER 
Pursuant to the JOINT STIPULATED SCHEDULING ORDER filed in the above matter, 
A. appellants National Parks Conservation Association ("NPCA") and William Wolverton 
submit the following preliminary statement of facts and issues presented by appellant's appeal 
from the Director's approval of an appraisal report regarding values of properties involved in 
Exchange 188 as sufficient to permit completion of that land exchange in fulfillment of SITLA's 
obligations under the order of the Utah Supreme Court in National Parks & Conservation 
Association v. Board of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909 (1992) ("NPCA case."), and 
B. appellants National Parks Conservation Association (NPCA) submits the following 
preliminary statement of facts and issues presented by appellant's appeal from the Director's 
October 5, 2006 denial of NPCA's PETITION FOR A RULE CHANGE dated 18 January 2006 
[Hereafter, "rulemaking petition."] 
Appellants understand that, following this submission and a similar preliminary submission of 
facts and issues by coimsel for SITLA, the parties will review the respective submissions for the 
purpose of submitting a joint statement of issues of both fact and law on which there is 
agreement between the parties, and on which there is disagreement, by 16 January 2007. 
APPEAL REGARDING EXCHANGE 188 
I. ISSUES OF FACT 
A. Background facts pertinent to issues in the NPCA case that are relevant to the parties' rights 
and duties in disposition of the lands at issue in Exchange 188, including facts regarding: 
1. NPCA's previous requests for declaratory rulings, actions by the Director and Board of State 
Lands, and judicial determinations, as established by the Utah Supreme Court in the NPCA case. 
2. Any steps taken by SITLA to comply with the order and opinion of the Court in the NPCA 
case prior to the arrangements it made to obtain the "Limited Restricted Use Report" by Morley 
& McConlcie [hereafter, "McConlcie Report"] on which it relied for appraisal compliance and in 
support of its 15 September 2006 final agency action on Exchange 188. 
3. Actions talcen by Garfield County in April 2006 to excavate fill material from approximately 
one-half acre of land in Section 16 for use in road work on the Burr Trail, constituting a direct 
violation of the stay of action in Section 16 entered by the Utah Supreme Court in the NPCA 
case. 
4. Any knowledge by SITLA or its responsible employees or officers regarding any actions by 
Garfield County that could reasonable be understood to constitute a violation of the stay of the 
Exchange 188 transaction entered by the Court in the NPCA case. 
5. Any steps taken by SITLA to seek remedies for or otherwise address any actions by Garfield 
County that could reasonable be understood to constitute a violation of the stay of the Exchange 
188 transaction entered by the Court in the NPCA case. 
6. Any steps talcen by SITLA to comply with or fulfill the objectives of the guidance provided by 
the Supreme Court in the NPCA case to the following effect: 
The Division should recognize that some school lands have unique scenic, 
paleontological, and archeological values that would have little economic value on the 
open market, hi some cases, it would be unconscionable not to preserve and protect those 
values. It may be possible for the Division to protect and preserve those values without 
diminishing the economic value of the land. For example, with appropriate restrictions it 
may be possible for livestock grazing and perhaps even mineral extraction to occur on a 
school section without damaging archaeological and paleontological sites. But when 
economic exploitation of such lands is not compatible with the noneconomic values, the 
state may have to consider exchanging public trust lands or other state lands for school 
lands. Indeed, it might be necessary for the state to buy or lease the school lands from the 
trust so that unique noneconomic values can be preserved and protected and the full 
economic value of the school trust lands still realized. 
[869P.2d921] 
B. Facts relevant to determination of the "standing" of NPCA and of William Wolverton. 
including facts regarding: 
1. NPCA's role and continuing activities, on behalf of its members, seeking to protect Utah 
national parks, specifically including Capitol Reef National Park, from land ownership or 
development activities that may conflict with the natural, scenic, aesthetic and recreational values 
for whose protection these parks are reserved. 
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2. NPCA's role and continuing activities and specific administrative steps and litigation efforts, 
on behalf of its members, taken to prevent development or road improvement activities on the 
Burr Trail, specifically including the road and adjacent areas in Section 16 and including its 
activities and litigation in the NPCA case challenging Exchange 188. 
3. Use and enjoyment of the natural, scenic, aesthetic and recreational values of Capitol Reef 
National Park, specifically including areas within Section 16, by NPCA members including 
William Wolverton. 
4. The interest and activities of NPCA and William Wolverton in taking action to ensure that the 
national park values they seek to protect, as described above, are not degraded as a result of 
unlawful activities, uses or occupancy on lands within Capitol Reef National Park. 
C. Facts relevant to the understanding and acceptance by SITLA and Garfield County of the 
value of lands purported to be exchanged in Exchange 188, including facts regarding: 
1. Garfield County's understanding and acceptance of the fact that the properties it would convey 
to SITLA in Exchange 188 were valued at a total of $661,000, based on the McConkie Report 
dated 25 August 2005. 
2. Whether Garfield County determined or claimed that it received or would receive any 
compensation for conveyance of its lands in Exchange 188 other than or in addition to SITLA5s 
conveyance to the County of Section 16, Township 34, Range 8 East. 
3. SITLA's understanding and acceptance of the fact that the properties it would convey to 
Garfield County in Exchange 188 were valued at a total of $200,000, based on the McConkie 
Report dated 25 August 2005. 
4. Whether SITLA determined or claimed that Garfield County received or would receive any 
compensation for conveyance of the County lands in Exchange 188 other than or in addition to 
SITLA's conveyance to the County of Section 16, Township 34, Range 8 East. 
5. Whether any other facts are pertinent to determining the lawfulness of the County's action in 
conveying land valued at $661,000 in exchange for acquiring land valued at $200,000, or to 
determining the validity of SITLA's action in approving those values for completion of 
Exchange 188. 
D. Facts pertinent to the lawfulness and adequacy of the "Limited Restricted Use Report" 
prepared by Morely and McConkie, L.C. for use as an independent and accurate appraisal of the 
values of the lands involved in Exchange 188 and for satisfaction of the requirement for an 
independent appraisal as ordered by the Utah Supreme Court in the NPCA case, including facts 
regarding: 
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1. All limitations or restrictions on the content and analysis of the McConkie report, and all 
"allowable departures" from the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practices, as 
recited in the McConkie Report, or otherwise adopted or utilized in rendering the McConkie 
Report for use by SITLA in connection with Exchange 188. 
2. All terms and conditions urged or required by SITLA or by Morley & McConkie applicable to 
the latter firm's preparation of the McConkie Report on which SITLA relied for compliance 
with the opinion and order of the Court in the NPCA case and in support of its 15 September 
2006 final agency action on Exchange 188. 
3. Any other oral or written understandings by or between SITLA and/or by Morley & 
McConkie and/or Garfield County regarding limitations on or allowable departures from the 
Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, or regarding valuation expectations, 
which could have influenced the valuations reported in the Limited Restricted Use Report. 
4. Any communications from or by SITLA or its predecessor agency advising Garfield County 
that the value of properties it must offer to effectuate Exchange 188 must be increased to some 
approximate or designated value over and above the value of properties initially proffered by the 
County for Exchange 188. 
5. Any communications between Garfield County and SITLA or its predecessor agency 
regarding the reason for or purpose of Garfield County's interest in the exchange by which it 
could acquire Section 16. 
6. The steepness of the terrain within Section 16, and the extent of land and building sites within 
Section 16 with slopes at low enough gradient to permit feasible and lawful access and 
construction. 
7. Whether Morley & McConkie, in preparing the McConkie Report, or SITLA in approving it, 
determined that despite the steepness of the Section 16 terrain, all or identified portions of the 
640 acres of Section 16 were sufficiently feasible for development or use as to be susceptible of 
sale in 40-acre lots as the basis for the values specified in the Report - and if so, the factual and 
analytical basis for that determination. 
8. Whether Morley & McConkie, in preparing the McConkie Report, or SITLA in approving it, 
made any determination regarding the effect on land values in Section 16 resulting from the 
steepness of the terrain or the absence of water and utilities, and if so, the content of and factual 
and analytical basis for that determination. 
9. Whether Morley & McConkie, in preparing the McConkie Report, or SITLA in approving it, 
made any inquiries, investigations or determinations regarding applicable regulatory restrictions 
governing construction on and use of the land within Section 16 that would or could result from 
exercise of regulatory authority over the land by the National Park Service in compliance with 
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the National Park Service Organic Act and other regulatory protections for the natural, scenic, 
aesthetic and recreational use of land within Capitol Reef National Park. And whether either 
Morley & McConkie or SITLA made any determination regarding the effect on land values in 
Section 16 that would or could result from such regulatory restrictions; and if so, the content and 
analytical basis for that determination. 
10. In considering and ultimately approving the McConkie Report and the values specified 
therein as satisfying the appraisal requirements imposed by the NPCA case, whether SITLA 
made any inquiries or investigation, gave any consideration, or made any determinations 
regarding the factors inquired about in paragraphs 5-9 above, or their effect on the adequacy of 
the appraisal and values for Exchange 188. If so, the content of any such inquiries or 
investigation , and the content and factual basis for any such determination. 
E. Facts regarding any consideration by SITLA of means to protect the natural scenic, aesthetic 
or recreational values of Section 16 while returning fair value to the school trust 
1. Whether, after the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in the NPCA case, SITLA considered 
or reviewed the possibility of conveying Section 16 to the National Park Service or another entity 
that would provide protection of the natural, scenic, aesthetic and recreational values of that 
Section in return for fair value compensation to the school trust? 
2. If SITLA did consider the possibility discussed in paragraph 1, what arrangements for that 
purpose did SITLA consider, what decision was made, and what were the factual and legal 
grounds for that decision? 
3. If SITLA did not consider the possibility discussed in paragraph 1, was a specific decision 
made not to consider it, and what were the factual and legal grounds for that decision? 
4. In considering, or failing or declining to consider a fair value conveyance to an entity that 
could provide protection of Section 16's natural, scenic, aesthetic and recreational values, did 
SITLA give any consideration to the effect on the value of the section to the school fund that may 
result from regulatory restrictions on the use of Section 16 attributable to its presence within a 
national park? If so, what factors were considered; and if not, why not? 
5. Whether, after the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in the NPCA case, SITLA considered 
and/or carried out any steps that would or were intended to provide protection of the natural, 
scenic, aesthetic and recreational values of Section 16. If so, what steps were taken; and if not, 
why not. 
6. Whether SITLA has adopted or applied any policies or practices for the purpose of protecting 
any kind of noneconomic values on any lands held subject to school tmst obligations. If so what 
lands were or are involved, what policies or practices were adopted, and what if any legal 
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protections were or are applicable to those lands other than or in addition to SITLA's policies or 
practices? 
7. In determining whether to approve the McConlcie Report as the basis for the values involved in 
Exchange 188, did SITLA have any legal authority to reject or cancel that exchange and enter 
into a transaction for conveyance of Section 16 , at fair value, to the National Park Service or 
other purchaser committed to protecting the natural, scenic, aesthetic and recreational values on 
that section? 
II ISSUES OF LAW 
A. With regard to the background facts and legal considerations arising from the NPCA case: 
1. Whether under the remand for a new appraisal ordered by the Supreme Court in the NPCA 
case, or under any other legal requirement, SITLA was legally required by its earlier transaction 
with Garfield County to complete Exchange 188 despite the unlawfulness of the appraisal on 
which the exchange was first based. 
2. After the Supreme Court invalidated the lawfulness of the first appraisal, did SITLA or its 
predecessor thereafter have lawful authority to seek invalidation of the conveyance to Garfield 
County and approve a different transaction by which Section 16 could be conveyed for fair value 
to the National Park Service or another entity with a commitment to protect the natural, scenic, 
aesthetic and recreational values of that section. 
3. Whether a violation by Garfield County of the terms of the stay entered by the Supreme Court 
in the NPCA case could legally affect any obligation SITLA might have had to remain bound by 
its earlier decision to convey Section 16 to Garfield County? 
4. Whether, in determining tlie future disposition of Section 16, SITLA had any legal obligation 
to consider or explain its judgment regarding the factors and possible steps for protection of the 
noneconomic values of that Section discussed by the Utah Supreme Court in the NPCA case? 
B. Whether NPCA and William Wolverton have standing to appeal the SITLA agency action 
approving the Morlev and McConkie "Limited Restricted Use Appraisal Report" as the basis for 
completing Exchange 188. 
1. Based on the standing of NPCA and standing concepts established in the NPCA case. 
2. Based on application of the concepts and analysis of the Utah Supreme Court in Utah Chapter 
of the Sierra Club, et al v. Utah Air Quality Board, et a l P.2d , 2006 UT 73 (Utah 
Supreme Court No. 20050454, Nov. 21, 2006). 
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C. Lawfulness of the compensation received by Garfield County under Exchange 188, and the 
effect of unlawful compensation on the validity of action by SITLA to approve the Exchange or 
to enter into an alternative transaction protecting Section 16 
1. Do the values approved for Exchange 188 in the Morley & McConkie Report, as approved by 
SITLA, render unlawful the conveyances by Garfield County in Exchange 188 because the 
County will received inadequate compensation for the lands it conveys in the Exchange? And is 
Garfield County thereby barred from completing, or required to reverse or renegotiate the 
transaction? 
2. If the transaction by Garfield County is unlawful because of inadequate compensation to the 
County, can SITLA lawfully participate in and claim the benefits of that inadequate 
compensation by approving and completing the exchange transaction on the basis of the values in 
the McConkie Report? Or does the unlawfulness of the transaction bar SITLA from completing 
it on those terms? 
3. Does SITLA's claimed legal obligation to maximize financial return to the school trust 
authorize it to participate in and benefit from transactions otherwise unlawful under state or 
federal law? 
4. If Exchange 188 cannot lawfully be completed on the basis of the values in the McConkie 
Report, is SITLA then legally free to negotiate a different disposition of Section 16? 
5. If Exchange 188 cannot lawfully be completed on the basis of the values in the McConkie 
Report, could SITLA then lawfully conclude a transaction for fair value conveying the Section to 
the National Park Service or another entity committed to protecting the natural, scenic, aesthetic 
and recreational values of that Section, including if SITLA receives full value for the Section? 
6. If SITLA is legally free to negotiate a protective disposition of Section 16, does the Supreme 
Court's decision in the NPCA case require it to give consideration to the factors that support such 
a disposition, including : 
(a) SITLA5s authority to approve such a transaction, as reflected in any comparable practice 
of modifying use or disposition of trust lands for protection of archeological sites or to 
comply with other regulatory or policy goals ; 
(b ) the limitations on value of Section 16 likely to arise from the regulatory restrictions that 
will constrain the economic value of any development within Capitol Reef National Park, 
and the continuing costs involved in disputing or litigating such regulatory constraints; 
©) the limitations on value of the section arising from its precipitous terrain; 
(d) the limitations on value of the section arising from the unavailability of utility service and 
water; 
(e) the tourist value to the state of a public policy of protecting national parks by preserving 
nearby properties rather than subjecting them to incompatible development; 
(f) the greater feasibility of negotiating a fair value transaction with a solvent protective 
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entity at the reduced value likely to result from the various factors inadequately 
considered by the Morley & McConlde Report, including: 
* the restrictions and "allowable departures" from proper appraisal practice as 
acknowledged in that Report; 
* the steepness of the terrain and resulting diminished development value; 
* the unavailability of access to utilities and water. 
D. The legal adequacy of the McConlde Report to support Exchange 188 - specifically, whether 
the various inadequacies of the Report in failing to consider factors important to valuation render 
the Report inadequate as an appraisal that can satisfy the Supreme Court's mandate in the NPCA 
case. 
APPEAL REGARDING PETITION FOR A RULE CHANGE 
I. ISSUES OF FACT 
A. Facts regarding NPCA filing of its January 18, 2006 PETITION FOR A RULE CHANGE, the 
Director's October 5, 2006 letter of denial (with attachments), and NPCA's October 18. 2006 
Appeal from that denial. 
B. Facts regarding the factors considered by the Director in denying NPCA's rulemaking 
petition: 
1. Whether the Director considered any facts, or made any inquiries or studies about the 
management constraints or limitations of use that may be applicable to state trust lands held 
within national parks or the other management units for which this rule was proposed by NPCA. 
2. Specifically, whether the Director made any inquiries, studies or determination regarding uses 
and activities on state trust lands that may be prohibited or regulated within such management 
units, and how such prohibitions or regulations may limit or diminish remunerative use, lease, 
exchange or sale of such trust lands. 
3. Specifically, whether the Director made any inquiries, studies or determinations regarding the 
effect of such prohibitions or regulations on the fair or appraisal value of state school trust lands 
held within national parks or the other management units for which this rule was proposed by 
NPCA. 
4. Whether the Director's response to NPCA's rulemaking petition misunderstood or otherwise 
erroneously responded on the mistaken premise that NPCA seeks a rule that would give 
preference to protection of noneconomic values over return to the trust in managing school trust 
lands held within national parks or the other management units for which this rule was proposed 
by NPCA. Specifically, whether the Director understood that NPCA's rulemaking petition 
would provide occasion to consider whether better advantage to the school fund could come from 
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a protective disposition of the sort proposed in the rule than from retention of properties subject 
to often-rigorous regulatory restrictions on activities and uses. 
5. Whether the Director sought or obtained any legal advice regarding the extent of regulatory 
authority that may be exercised for the protection of noneconomic values within national parks 
and the other management units for which the rules was proposed. 
C. Incorporation of pertinent fact issues from NPCA's Preliminary Statement Regarding Issues of 
Fact and Law to be determined in the pending APPEAL FROM FINAL AGENCY ACTION BY 
THE SITLA DIRECTOR DATED 15 SEPTEMBER 2006 IN RE EXCHANGE 188. 
Certain aspects of the NPCA/Wolverton appeal from the Director's action approving the 
McConkie Report as the basis for Exchange 188 are highly pertinent in illustrating facts and 
considerations which NPCA contends should be taken into account by SITLA in its decision 
regarding NPCA's rulemaking petition. Thus, the fact issues listed in this section duplicate, and 
are numbered in brackets] to conform to the parallel Preliminary Statement of Facts filed with 
respect to NPCA'S appeal on Exchange 188. They include facts regarding the following 
[Paragraph A, Issue 6] 
Any steps taken by SITLA to comply with or fulfill the objectives of the guidance provided by 
the Supreme Court in the NPCA case to the following effect: 
The Division should recognize that some school lands have unique scenic, 
paleontological, and archeological values that would have little economic value on the 
open market. In some cases, it would be unconscionable not to preserve and protect those 
values. It may be possible for the Division to protect and preserve those values without 
diminishing the economic value of the land. For example, with appropriate restrictions it 
may be possible for livestock grazing and perhaps even mineral extraction to occur on a 
school section without damaging archaeological and paleontological sites. But when 
economic exploitation of such lands is not compatible with the noneconomic values, the 
state may have to consider exchanging public trust lands or other state lands for school 
lands. Indeed, it might be necessary for the state to buy or lease the school lands from the 
trust so that unique noneconomic values can be preserved and protected and the full 
economic value of the school trust lands still realized. 
[869P.2d921] 
[Paragraph B]. Facts relevant to determination of the "standing" of NPCA and of William 
Wolverton, including facts regarding: - (All listed issues.) 
[Paragraph D, Issue 9] 
Whether Morley & McConkie, in preparing the McConkie Report, or SITLA in approving it, 
made any inquiries, investigations or determinations regarding applicable regulatory restrictions 
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governing construction on and use of the land within Section 16 that would or could result from 
exercise of regulatory authority over the land by the National Park Service in compliance with 
the National Park Service Organic Act and other regulatory protections for the natural, scenic, 
aesthetic and recreational use of land within Capitol Reef National Park. And whether either 
Morley & McConkie or SITLA made any determination regarding the effect on land values in 
Section 16 that would or could result from such regulatory restrictions; and if so, the content and 
analytical basis for that determination. 
[Paragraph E:] 
Facts regarding any consideration by SITLA of means to protect the natural scenic, aesthetic or 
recreational values of Section 16 while returning fair value to the school trust - All listed issues, 
as follows: 
1. Whether, after the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in the NPCA case, SITLA considered 
or reviewed the possibility of conveying Section 16 to the National Park Service or another entity 
that would provide protection of the natural, scenic, aesthetic and recreational values of that 
Section in return for fair value compensation to the school trust? 
2. If SITLA did consider the possibility discussed in paragraph 1, what arrangements for that 
purpose did SITLA consider, what decision was made, and what were the factual and legal 
grounds for that decision? 
3. If SITLA did not consider the possibility discussed in paragraph 1, was a specific decision 
made not to consider it, and what were the factual and legal grounds for that decision? 
4. In considering, or failing or declining to consider a fair value conveyance to an entity that 
could provide protection of Section 16's natural, scenic, aesthetic and recreational values, did 
SITLA give any consideration to the effect on the value of the section to the school fund that may 
result from regulatory restrictions on the use of Section 16 attributable to its presence within a 
national park? If so, what factors were considered; and if not, why not? 
5. Whether, after the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in the NPCA case, SITLA considered 
and/or carried out any steps that would or were intended to provide protection of the natural, 
scenic, aesthetic and recreational values of Section 16. If so, what steps were taken; and if not, 
why not. 
6. Whether SITLA has adopted or applied any policies or practices for the purpose of protecting 
any kmd of noneconomic values on any lands held subject to school trust obligations. If so what 
lands were or are involved, what policies or practices were adopted, and what if any legal 
protections were or are applicable to those lands other than or in addition to SIMLA'S-policies or 
practices? 
7. hi determining whether to approve the McConkie Report as the basis for the values involved in 
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Exchange 188, did SITLA have any legal authority to reject or cancel that exchange and enter 
into a transaction for conveyance of Section 16 , at fair value, to the National Park Service or 
other purchaser committed to protecting the natural, scenic, aesthetic and recreational values on 
that section? 
II. QUESTIONS OF LAW 
A. Pertinent to SITLA's legal authority to adopt a rule of the kind and for the purpose proposed 
by NPCA: 
1. Whether the Director properly held that exercise of authority to adopt a rule of the kind and 
for the purpose proposed by NPCA would be incompatible with SITLA's obligations to the 
school trust, or would impermissibly "limit the full discretionary authority of the Agency to 
"manage, maintain, or dispose" of trust assets. 
2. Whether SITLA or the Director actually possesses "full discretionary authority" to "manage, 
maintain, or dispose" of trust assets where those assets are comprised of lands held within 
various state and national management units whose designated managers are empowered with 
regulatory authority committed to protect noneconomic values on those lands. 
3. In what way would the consideration of fair value exchanges for the purpose and as proposed 
by NPCA (or with permissible amendments) contradict or defeat SITLA' obligation to manage 
trust lands for the benefit of the school trust? If there is a rule that so rigidly forbids such 
consideration, has SITLA undertaken to adopt that rule through the rulemaking process as 
required by the Utah Rulemaking Act at sec. 63-46a-3(g)? 
4. Whether, and the extent to which, the regulatory authority available to managers of national 
parks or other protective management units may lawfully be exercised to prohibit or restrict 
activities or uses of state school trust lands within those units in a manner that may significantly 
reduce the value of those uses or of the affected trust lands. 
5. Whether, in considering a petition for rulemaking, SITLA's authority to consider the proposed 
rule is confined to the exact text of the rule as proposed, or whether SITLA may respond to the 
proposal with a modified version designed to address problems perceived in the original 
proposal? 
6. Whether the rule as proposed by NPCA was so far beyond SITLA's authority that SITLA was 
barred by rulemaking procedure, including Administrative Rule Rl5-2-5, from acting on the rule 
proposal by developing a modified rule more compatible with its authority and obligations. 
7. Was the Director correct in concluding that the SUWA case, on which he relies in his decision 
on NPCA's rulemaking petition, bars SIMLA from taking any actions based on considerations 
involving protection of noneconomic values? 
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7. Li the SUWA case, relied on by the Director in his decision on NPCA's rulemaking petition, 
the Board repeatedly emphasized that even under its present management practices, 
development prospects for school trust lands are often qualified by steps to comply with other 
regulatory requirements. (SUWA case, Order at 21.) What, if any, legal basis is there for 
concluding that SITLA has similar authority to take steps for adoption of a rule that would 
facilitate fair value dispositions of land as a means of avoiding the management conflicts 
associated with lands held within national parks or the other management units for which this 
rule was proposed by NPCA? 
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